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Abstract
A large proportion of international trade is in intermediate goods. The implications
of this empirical regularity, however, have not been exhaustively explored in several
aspects. The main objective of the thesis is to ll in the gap by introducing trade in
intermediate goods into several strands of literature in international economics. This
thesis is a collection of three essays studying the implications of trade in intermediate
goods for the degree of exchange rate pass-through (Chapter 2), rms invoicing
currency choice (Chapter 3) and the performance of the gravity models (Chapter 4).
In Chapter 2 I present a theoretical framework and show that back-and-forth trade
between two countries is associated with low degrees of aggregated exchange rate
pass-through. In Chapter 3 I focus instead on rm heterogeneity in the dependence
on imported inputs. I show theoretically that exporters more dependent on foreign
currency-denominated inputs are more likely to price in the foreign currency. I then
test the theoretical prediction using an innovative and unique dataset that covers
all UK trade transactions with non-EU partners from HM Revenue and Customs
(HMRC). Overall the results strongly support the theoretical prediction. Chapter
4 is a theoretical piece of work showing how the underlying trade structure alters
the predictions of the gravity models. I relate gravity equations to labour shares
of income. Given that these parameters are industry-specic, the results suggest
that it is crucial to take them into account when the main research interest lies in
sectoral di¤erences in bilateral trade.
viii
Chapter 1
Introduction
Trade in intermediate goods accounts for as much as two thirds of international trade
(WTO International Trade Statistics 2013). The increasing interconnectedness of
production processes among countries has also been studied quite extensively by
trade economists.1 For OECD countries, the annual average growth rate of trade
in intermediate goods between 1995 and 2006 was around 6.2%, a rate higher than
output growth.2 With trade in intermediate goods, there is an underlying trade
structure in which a countrys exports embed imported inputs while imports consist
of its exported inputs. This underlying pattern, however, is not captured in most
trade studies with models of nal goods only.
It was not until recent years that trade in intermediate goods started to attract
more scholarly attention. This is perhaps due to an absence of a comprehensive
data set decomposing world trade ows by end-use. Another possible explanation
is that trade in intermediate goods was simply considered a constant share of total
trade, since empirically the share has remained stable over time.
The global nancial and economic crisis in 2008, however, revealed the im-
portance of cross-border intermediate input linkages in explaining the widespread
declines in world trade. When demand for the nal good is ultimately spread
out over demand for intermediates in many countries, the transmission of demand
shocks during a slowdown may be more rapid and greater for some regions and
industries.3 Trade in intermediate goods thus deserves special attention from trade
policymakers.
1 In the thesis, trade in intermediate goods is dened broadly as the exchange of inputs, distinct
from a narrower denition of vertical specialisation, the production process in which several coun-
tries participate in various stages of single production chains. Other related terms include global
value chains, vertical specialisation, outsourcing and fragmentation. See Hummels, Ishii and Yi
(2001) for the denitions.
2See the OECD policy paper by Miroudot, Lanz and Ragoussis (2009).
3See Bems, Johnson and Yi (2011), for example, for the role of vertical linkages in accounting
for the collapse of world trade during the global recession of 2008-2009. Also, Bems, Johnson and
Yi (2010) examine the demand spillovers and the elasticity of world trade to GDP in the recession.
1
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This thesis is a collection of three essays studying the implications of trade in
intermediate goods for the macroeconomy as well as the performance of the gravity
models in explaining bilateral trade ows. Chapter 2 studies theoretically how a
back-and-forth trade structure between two countries alters the responses of do-
mestic prices to a change in exchange rates (i.e. the degree of exchange rate pass-
through). This chapter is motivated by the debates on how currency denomination
in international trade a¤ects the degree of exchange rate pass-through in the new
open economy macroeconomic (NOEM) literature.4 I introduce trade in intermedi-
ate goods into a framework with endogenous currency choice and examine how the
use of intermediate goods alters the equilibrium degrees of pass-through. Chapter
3 examines the link between the use of intermediate goods in production and rms
invoicing currency choice. It focuses in particular on rm heterogeneity in the de-
gree of dependence on imported inputs. I also provide empirical evidence on rms
invoicing currency choice from UK customs data. In Chapter 4 I introduce trade
in intermediate goods into a model with complete specialisation and monopolistic
competition and derive the gravity equations capturing trade in both nal goods
and intermediate goods. The focus of the paper is to highlight how the underlying
trade pattern alters the predictions of the gravity equations. The thesis structure
is shown in Figure 1.1.
1.1 Relation to the Literature
There has been a growing interest in the growth and accounting of trade in inter-
mediate goods in the literature.5 Campa and Goldberg (1997) report the growing
imported input shares in all manufacturing industries in the UK, Canada and the
US from 1974 to 1993. Hummels, Ishii and Yi (2001) construct a measure of vertical
specialisation (VS) and show that growth in vertical specialisation accounts for 30%
of the export growth in 10 OECD countries between 1970 and 1990.6 More recent
work has started to construct a systematic measure to account for global produc-
tion sharing. Johnson and Noguera (2012), for example, calculate the value-added
contents of exports (VAX ratios) for 94 countries and 57 sectors in 2004. Since these
4The NOEM models, pioneered by Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1995), have two distinctive features:
(i) a general-equilibrium set-up based on microfoundations and (ii) the introduction of nominal
rigidities and imperfect competition. See Lane (2001) for a survey study. Also see Bowman and
Doyle (2003) for a discussion on currency denomination in the NOEM literature.
5Trade in intermediate goods can be assessed using either country input-output tables or the
United Nations Broad Economic Categories (BEC) classication. See Miroudot, Lanz and Ragous-
sis (2009) for the advantages and drawbacks of the two methodologies.
6They use OECD input-output database. Vertical specialisation is dened as the production
process in which several countries participate in various stages of single production chains. The
VS measures of Hummels et al. (2001) capture the imported contents of exports, or equivalently,
foreign value-added embodied in a countrys gross output of exports.
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Figure 1.1: Thesis Structure
measures capture the domestic value-added contents of exports, a higher VAX ratio
implies less use of imported inputs in producing exporting goods. Chapter 3 is an
example of the application of the VAX ratios. I use the VAX ratios at the coun-
try and country-industry levels to proxy for the degree of dependence on imported
inputs.7
Another important feature all the three chapters share is an imperfectly compet-
itive market. Under perfect competition rms have no market power to determine
the prices, whereas rms in imperfectly competitive markets are able to practice
price discrimination. The earlier literature usually assumed perfect competition
and hence the law of one price holds. By moving to imperfectly competitive models
this has allowed to assume that the LOOP fails and permitted to better understand
issues such as pricing-to-market and market segmentation.8 Apart from the price-
setting aspect, assuming imperfect competition is also crucial to the discussion of
currency denomination as this has allowed to endogenise exporterscurrency choice.
In both Chapter 2 and 3 rms are assumed to choose an invoicing currency which
maximises their prots.
In the trade literature, the assumptions of imperfect competition and product
7They use the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) database with input-output tables. The
VAX ratios at the country-industry level are not published in the paper.
8For the pricing to market (PTM) literature on exchange rate pass-through, see Krugman (1987),
Knetter (1989; 1993) and Goldberg and Knetter (1997), among others.
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di¤erentiation yield a di¤erent motive of trade: economies of scale, rather than
di¤erences in technology which generate comparative advantages in the Ricardian
model, or in factor endowments in the Heckscher-Ohlin model. If goods are dif-
ferentiated and production takes place under increasing returns to scale, then even
exactly identical countries would trade with one another, and would benet from
opening up to trade.9
Below I turn to discuss other related literature for each chapter separately. Chap-
ter 2 belongs to the new open economy macroeconomics (NOEM) literature on in-
complete exchange rate pass-through. In the earlier NOEM models such as Obstfeld
and Rogo¤ (1995) and Galí and Monacelli (2005), the LOOP is assumed and there-
fore exchange rate pass-through is complete. Later studies have attempted to model
incomplete pass-through from several perspectives, such as pricing-to-market (e.g.
Sutherland, 2005), the existence of a retail sector (e.g. Smets and Wouters, 2002
and Monacelli, 2005) and presence of trade transaction costs (e.g. Corsetti and
Dedola, 2005). The main debate, however, has been centered around whether rms
choose to pre-set the prices of exports in the producers currency or the importers
currency (e.g. Betts and Devereux, 1996). Invoicing currency choice directly deter-
mines whether domestic prices respond to a change in exchange rates and therefore
has strong implications for the degree of exchange rate pass-through. Most earlier
studies, however, take invoicing currency choice as exogenous and not until recently
did the literature start to model endogenous currency choice (e.g. Devereux, En-
gel and Storgaard, 2004). Chapter 2 adds new insight into the NOEM literature
by introducing trade in intermediate goods into the framework of Devereux, Engel
and Storgaard (2004) with endogenous currency choice. The main contribution of
this paper is to identify the channels through which back-and-forth trade a¤ects
pass-through in an environment of endogenous currency choice.
Chapter 3 is related to an extensive theoretical literature on the determinants
of invoicing currency.10 These determinants include: (i) macroeconomic consid-
erations, such as exchange rate volatility (Devereux et al., 2004) and transaction
costs of exchange (Devereux and Shi, 2013); (ii) industry characteristics, such as
market competition (Bacchetta and van Wincoop, 2003) and price-sensitivity of de-
mand (Bacchetta and van Wincoop, 2005); (iii) strategic characteristics, such as
bargaining between exporters and importers (Goldberg and Tille, 2008). The main
contribution of the chapter is to add an alternative but complementary determinant
of invoicing currency to the literature, namely rmsuse of imported inputs. The
9See Krugman (1979; 1980) for the frameworks of monopolistic competition and complete spe-
cialisation. It is also worth noting here that imperfect competition is not the only market structure
compatible with a gravity model.
10Early literature with a micro perspective include Baron (1976), Giovannini (1988), Donnenfeld
and Zilcha (1991) and Friberg (1998).
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model setting in Chapter 3 is based on the framework developed in Chapter 2 but
deviates to incorporate rm heterogeneity in the degree of dependence on imported
inputs.11
From an empirical perspective, evidence on rm-level invoicing currency choice
remains scarce. This is due to limited disaggregated data on invoicing currency. One
example is the survey study of Friberg and Wilander (2008) on Swedish exporters
currency considerations. A study that uses similar empirical models to mine is
Goldberg and Tille (2011). They document the evidence on strategic interactions
from Canadian import transactions.12 This chapter uses an innovative dataset from
UK customs to provide rm-level evidence on the link between the dependence on
imported inputs and exporterscurrency choice. Another contribution of the paper
is to link rm-level characteristics such as rm size (in terms of export shares) and
rm experience (in terms of years of exporting) to the choice of invoicing currency.
In addition to the literature studying incomplete pass-through and the deter-
minants of invoicing currency choice, Chapter 2 and 3 also relate to the growing
literature on the frequencies of price adjustments. This new literature documents
di¤erences in price adjustments for goods invoiced in di¤erent currencies (e.g. Flo-
den and Wilander, 2006; Gopinath, Itskhoki and Rigobon, 2010). My papers share
the interest in currency denomination but di¤er in the consideration of the use
of imported inputs. Furthermore, some recent studies have looked into the direct
relationship between the use of imported inputs and the degree of pass-through
(e.g. Amiti, Itskhoki and Konings, 2014). In contrast to my focus on currency
choice, these studies highlight variable markups as the main channel through which
imported inputs alter the rm-level degree of exchange rate pass-through to prices.
Chapter 4, distinct from the other two chapters, relates to two strands of the
trade literature: trade theories on complete specialisation and monopolistic com-
petition and the gravity models. In the trade literature, a number of studies have
incorporated the use and trade of intermediate goods. Ethier (1982) introduces
di¤erentiated intermediate goods into Krugman (1979) and assumes homogeneous
nal goods. Hence all trade is in intermediate goods. My paper has a similar setting
based on the Krugman model, but di¤ers in allowing for trade in both intermediate
and nal goods. Krugman and Venables (1996) develop a model with the use and
trade of intermediate goods and discuss the welfare e¤ects of globalisation. In con-
trast to my interest in distinguishing trade in intermediate goods from nal goods,
their framework assumes that the composite intermediate good is the same as the
composite nal good, i.e. an identical elasticity of substitution between varieties
11See the overview of Chapter 3 in Section 1.3 for the detailed comparisons.
12They use industry-level variables such as market shares of exporters and transaction sizes to
proxy for the bargaining power of exporters and importers.
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in intermediate goods and varieties in nal goods. My paper distinguishes rms
elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods from consumerselasticity of
substitution between nal goods.
Gravity equations for gross trade can be derived from a number of trade mod-
els such as Krugman (1979), Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Melitz (2003). Some
scholars have also considered the cross-border intermediate input linkages. Noguera
(2012), for example, derives an approximation of the gravity equation for value-
added trade based on Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). Chapter 4 of the thesis,
however, is more closely related to the gravity literature which argues that the eco-
nomic mass variables (i.e. GDP) in gravity equations fail to be good proxies when
trade in intermediate goods are more dominant. Bergstrand and Egger (2010) and
Baldwin and Taglioni (2011), for example, show that the standard gravity variables
perform well on a huge database consisting a wide range of countries. When test-
ing the standard gravity equation on a subsample of the Factory Asian countries,
however, Baldwin and Taglioni (2011) report a relatively poor performance.13 The
approach in Chapter 4 di¤ers from these studies in the objective of identifying what
drives the di¤erences between trade in intermediate goods and nal goods from a
theoretical point of view. The main contribution of the paper is to relate gravity
equations to labour shares of income and show that these parameters should be
taken into account in analysing the e¤ects of industry-specic factors on bilateral
trade ows.
In the next sections I discuss each chapters background and provide an overview
of the key ndings.
1.2 Overview of Chapter 2
Chapter 2 of the thesis, "Back-and-forth Trade, Currency Choice and Endogenous
Exchange Rate Pass-through," examines theoretically how trade in intermediate
goods between two countries (hence the term back-and-forth trade) a¤ects the ag-
gregated degree of exchange rate pass-through.
1.2.1 Background
Exchange rate pass-through, by denition, is the percentage change in domestic
prices resulting from a one-percent change in the nominal exchange rate. From
a policy perspective, understanding exchange rate pass-through is critical due to
its far-ranging implications for the international transmission of macroeconomic
shocks, the e¤ectiveness of monetary policy, as well as the welfare benets of policy
13The Factory Asian countries include Japan, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand
and Taiwan.
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coordination. A scholarly consensus is that the degree of exchange rate pass-through
to import prices (and accordingly consumer prices) is less than complete and many
countries have experienced dramatic declines in the degree of pass-through.14
A great deal of theoretical e¤ort has been taken to explain the causes and the
underlying determinants of incomplete pass-through. A non-exclusive list includes:
price stickiness, pricing to market behaviour of rms, transportation costs, and the
existence of non-tradable goods. Following some pioneering microeconomic studies,
rms choice of invoicing currency also comes into the picture as another signi-
cant variable determining the degree of pass-through.15 Whether exporters tend to
choose local currency pricing (LCP) or producer currency pricing (PCP) has been
one of the most debated issues in the new open economy macroeconomics (NOEM)
literature. This is because these two extreme cases imply opposite exchange rate
pass-through behaviours: given price stickiness if all home imports are priced in the
foreign currency, there is full pass-through. That is, domestic prices respond one-to-
one to a change in exchange rates. On the contrary, if all home imports are priced
in the home currency, there is zero pass-through since prices do not respond to a
change in exchange rates.16 It was not until recently, however, that rmsinvoicing
currency choice was considered endogenous in the models.17
Given the observation that trade in intermediate goods is empirically evident and
not taken into account in the existing macroeconomic models, this paper attempts to
introduce trade in intermediate goods into an NOEMmodel setting with endogenous
currency choice. The main focus of the paper is on the implications of (aggregated)
input currency denomination for the (aggregated) degree of pass-through.
1.2.2 Preview of the Results
The model setting is based on Devereux, Engel and Storgaard (2004) with price
stickiness and endogenous currency choice. I introduce a simple two-way exchange
of intermediate goods between home and foreign into a general equilibrium set-up.
Prot-maximising rms are assumed to preset prices in either their own home cur-
rency or the foreign currency for their nal goods one period in advance, taking into
account the currency used for their imported inputs. Input currency denomination is
assumed exogenous with a certain share of rms facing home currency-denominated
14See Campa and Goldberg (2005) and Gagnon and Ihrig (2004) for empirical evidence for a
sample of industrialised countries.
15For example, Giovannini (1988) and Friberg (1998).
16Betts and Devereux (1996) are the rst who introduce LCP, as opposed to the assumption of
PCP in the Redux model (Obstfeld and Rogo¤, 1995), the rst benchmark model in the NOEM
literature. Bailliu and Fujii (2004) argue that in reality, these two cases coexist.
17See, for example, Devereux, Engel and Storgaard (2004) and Gopinath, Itskhoki and Rigobon
(2010).
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inputs whereas the rest faces foreign currency-denominated inputs.18 One justica-
tion for this assumption is the example of oil, which is mainly denominated in US
dollars. Another interpretation is that this captures rms that do not use imported
inputs in reality as their currency behaviour is identical to rms that use home
currency-denominated inputs from the models perspective.
The general equilibrium model yields two main results. Firstly, at an aggre-
gated level the more use of foreign currency-denominated inputs, the lower the pass-
through. I identify two channels. The rst direct channel is that a change in input
currency denomination leads to a change in rm composition. When there are more
rms facing foreign currency-denominated inputs, for example, lower pass-through
is observed since rms facing foreign currency-denominated inputs are more likely
to use the same currency (LCP) for exports. The second channel is an indirect one
through a two-way relationship between exchange rate volatility and pass-through:
exchange rate volatility a¤ects rmscurrency choice and consequently the degree
of pass-through. The degree of pass-through, in turn, a¤ects the distribution and
volatility of exchange rates. Overall, the results suggest that back-and-forth trade
is associated with lower exchange rate pass-through. Secondly, I nd a negative
relationship between the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign inter-
mediate goods and the equilibrium pass-through. This result relates to the empirical
evidence in the existing pass-through literature that higher pass-through occurs for
more homogenous product sectors (with lower elasticity of substitution).19
1.3 Overview of Chapter 3
Chapter 3 of the thesis, "Imported Inputs and Invoicing Currency Choice: Theory
and Evidence from UK Transaction Data," is my job market paper. The paper has
both theoretical and empirical parts. In this paper I investigate rm heterogeneity
in terms of exporters dependence on imported inputs and how this a¤ects their
choice of invoicing currency.
1.3.1 Background
Invoicing currency choice has real e¤ects on macroeconomy. For example, it a¤ects
how trade balances respond to a change in exchange rates in the short run. How
do exporters choose an invoicing currency? Until recently little was known beyond
a number of broad stylised facts, based mainly on aggregated data. Among those
facts, trade in primary products is mostly denominated in US dollars, while trade
18 I later relax this assumption in an appendix.
19See, for example, Gopinath, Itskhoki and Rigobon (2010).
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between developing and industrialized countries is predominantly invoiced in the in-
dustrialized countrys currency. It is also acknowledged that inationary currencies
are less likely to be used in foreign trade.20
The limitation of the existing literature is perhaps due to the limited availability
of disaggregated data on invoicing currency. This paper aims at lling in the em-
pirical gap by providing some stylized facts from an innovative dateset that covers
all UK trade transactions with non-EU partners from HM Revenue and Customs
(HMRC). The dataset is not publicly available.
Based on the theoretical results in Chapter 2, at an aggregated level input cur-
rency denomination has strong implications for rms invoicing currency choice.
The main research question this paper addresses is at the rm level how exporters
dependence on imported inputs a¤ects their invoicing currency choice. This chap-
ter is the rst to look at the dependence on imported inputs (at the rm-level)
as a theoretical determinant of exportersinvoicing currency and provide rm-level
evidence that supports the theoretical predictions.
1.3.2 Preview of the Results
The theoretical part of the paper is mainly based on the model presented in Section
2.2 of Chapter 2 and the cost structure is based on Halpern, Koren and Szeidl
(2011). It is a simple partial-equilibrium framework with price stickiness. The key
di¤erence from Chapter 2 is rm heterogeneity. In this paper, rms di¤er in their
productivity in using imported inputs, hence their dependences on imported inputs.
Table 1.1 provides a comparison of the model settings.
The model yields two testable hypotheses. Firstly, exporters more dependent on
foreign currency-denominated inputs are more likely to price in the foreign currency.
The intuition is that pricing in the foreign currency provides a natural hedge against
exchange rate uncertainty. Secondly, exchange rate volatility makes the rm prefer
its own currency (consistent with Devereux, Engel and Storgaard, 2004).
In the empirical part of the paper I rst document some stylized facts of currency
denomination for UK trade. I focus on the dataset that covers all trade transactions
with non-EU countries in 2011. The dataset has 2.54 million transactions for exports
and 7.31 millions for imports. I then match import and export data to relate
exportersinvoicing currency choice to import behaviour. The econometric results
strongly support the theoretical predictions.
Other ndings shed some light on relating currency choice to rm characteristics.
For instance, larger UK exporters are less inclined to use their domestic currency.
20See, for example, Grassman (1973), McKinnon (1979) and Tavlas (1991). Also, see Kamps
(2006) for a discussion.
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Table 1.1: Model Settings in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3
Chapter 2 Chapter 3
Focus of Analysis
Aggregated degree
of pass-through
Firm heterogeneity
in currency choice
Model General-equilibrium Partial-equilibrium
Demand CES CES
Baseline Model Devereux et al. (2004) Chapter 2 and
Halpern et al. (2011)
Firms Di¤er in input currency
denomination (2 Types)
Di¤er in dependence
on imported inputs
Input Currency
Denomination
Exogenous:
some rms PCP
others LCP
Exogenous:
All PCP
Currency Choice PCP or LCP PCP or LCP
Extension in
Appendices
Endogenous input
currency choice
Allowing for a third
vehicle currency
In contrast, all else being equal experienced rms (trading for more than ve years
in exporting markets) are more inclined to use pound sterling for exports.
These results have strong policy implications. Empirical evidence has shown
that in the UK pass-through to domestic prices exhibits signicant heterogeneity
across industries. The manufacturing and raw materials sectors, for example, have
much higher pass-through than the energy sector (Mumtaz, Oomen and Wang,
2006). Therefore identifying what determines currency choice and whether rm
characteristics play a role becomes crucial to fully understand the cause of the
variation.
1.4 Overview of Chapter 4
Chapter 4 of the thesis, "Gravity with Trade in Intermediate Goods," asks how
trade in intermediate goods alters the predictions of the gravity models.
Chapter 1. Introduction 11
1.4.1 Background
The gravity model of trade estimates bilateral trade ows based on the economic
sizes and distance between two countries, as well as other variables that a¤ect trade
costs. The model has been an empirical success in explaining the e¤ects of distance-
related factors on bilateral trade ows. These include national borders, tari¤ and
non-tari¤ barriers, trade costs, as well as non-economic factors such as cultural and
language di¤erences.
However few studies in the existing gravity literature have incorporated trade
in intermediate goods. Given the rise of global production sharing, it is natural to
ask what drives up trade in intermediate goods and how it di¤ers from trade in
nal goods. This paper therefore aims at introducing trade in intermediate goods
into a trade model compatible with the gravity equations to analyse to what extent
the use and trade in intermediate goods matters to the predictions of the standard
gravity models with nal goods trade only.
1.4.2 Preview of the Results
I start with an accounting exercise showing that even without trade in intermediate
goods, gravity models over-predict trade volume with the presence of (domestically
produced) intermediate goods. More interestingly, trade in intermediate goods helps
mitigate such e¤ect. I also show that the standard frictionless gravity model predicts
a lower volume of trade for smaller importing countries.
I then build a general equilibrium model based on Krugman (1979) with complete
specialisation and monopolistic competition. The rst nding is that there are gains
from trade for both trade in intermediate goods and nal goods. The degree depends
on the elasticities of substitution and the production function parameters. I then
derive gravity equations for trade in both types of goods separately.
The model results show that labour shares of income enter the two gravity
equations with di¤erent signs. More interestingly, the weighted averages on labour
shares of income in the importing country and the exporting country also enter
the equations with di¤erent signs. This is because in the model, a higher labour
share of income in the exporting country implies a larger intermediate goods sector
(which uses labour only). The same parameter for the importing country, however,
captures higher income spent on nal goods. Given that the parameter is industry-
specic, the implication of these results is that it is crucial to take it into account
when the main research interest is the e¤ects of industry-specic factors on bilateral
trade ows.
Chapter 2
Back-and-forth Trade, Currency
Choice and Endogenous
Exchange Rate Pass-through
2.1 Introduction
It has been widely acknowledged that the nature of international trade has evolved
toward more intra-industry trade, in contrast to the classical theories based on the
concept of comparative advantage.21 East Asian economies, in particular, have
not only experienced the expansion of intra-regional trade in nal goods, but also
increasing intra-industry trade of intermediate goods such as machinery parts and
components (i.e. back-and-forth trade). By denition, back-and-forth trade exists
when countries involve in any exchange in intermediate goods.22 With back-and-
forth trade, exports consist of imported inputs and imports consist of exported
inputs. Therefore it is important to take international trade interdependence into
account when analysing trade structure.
Such phenomena, albeit empirically evident, are not yet well explored at a more
aggregate macroeconomic level in terms of their implications for policy design.23
21 Intra-industry trade refers to the exchange of (intermediate or nal) products belonging to the
same industry. It has been divided into two sub-concepts: horizontally di¤erentiated products (i.e.
with similar quality and price) and vertically di¤erentiated ones.
22 In this paper, back-and-forth trade is a broad concept distinct from a narrower denition
of vertical specialisation, the production process in which several countries participate in various
stages of single production chains. See Hummels, Ishii and Yi (2001) for the denition. Other
labels equivalent to vertical specialisation may be identied in the literature, e.g. slicing up the
value chain, outsourcing, fragmentation and production network.
23For example, Ando and Kimura (2003) conrm the importance of the back-and-forth trade of
machinery parts and components in East Asia. Haddad (2007) provides evidence on the increasing
trend of vertical specialisation. The denitions of vertical specialisation in these two papers are
consistent with Hummels et al. (2001). Also, the IMFs Asia and Pacic Regional Economic
Outlook 2007, reports a rise in Asian intra-industry trade, identifying a 60-65 per cent share of the
12
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Put di¤erently, although much scholarly attention has been given to the nature and
the explanation of intra-industry trade, how this interdependence impacts macro-
economic performances, in particular exchange rate pass-through to domestic price
levels, remains unexplained.24 This observation motivates the research idea to intro-
duce trade interconnectedness into the new open economy macroeconomics (NOEM)
literature.
The understanding of exchange rate pass-through is believed to be crucial due to
its strong implications for the international transmission of macroeconomic shocks,
the e¤ectiveness of monetary policy, as well as the welfare benets of policy coordi-
nation. A scholarly consensus is that the degree of exchange rate pass-through to
import prices (and accordingly consumer prices) is less than complete, and many
countries have experienced dramatic declines in the degree of pass-through since
1990s.25 To understand the underlying determinants of incomplete pass-through,
most theoretical work in the NOEM literature has focused on invoicing currency
choice, i.e. di¤erent pricing behaviour of exporters in di¤erent markets. One of the
early debates is whether exporters choose local currency pricing (LCP) or producer
currency pricing (PCP), since these two extreme cases imply opposite exchange rate
pass-through behaviour (i.e. zero pass-through in the case of LCP and full pass-
through in PCP).26 These debates have brought about later studies that regard
currency choice as endogenous in the models, e.g. Devereux, Engel and Storgaard
(2004; hereafter DES).27
This paper belongs to the NOEM literature and the model setting is based on
DES (2004), with price and wage stickiness. I introduce a simple two-way exchange
of intermediate goods between home and foreign countries into a general equilibrium
set-up where rms choose their invoicing currency (for nal goods) endogenously.
The share of inputs denominated in the foreign currency is assumed exogenous. One
intermediate goods in trade ows into emerging East Asian countries.
24One of the few exceptions is Ghosh (2009) who hypothesizes that production sharing is one
of the underlying factors of the empirical decline of pass-through. He uses a partial equilibrium
model and focuses on the incomplete pass-through of intermediate goods due to exporterspricing
to market (PTM) behaviour, rather than currency of invoicing.
25See Campa and Goldberg (2005) for an empirical examination of pass-through to import prices
for 25 OECD countries, and Gagnon and Ihrig (2004), for pass-through to consumer prices for a
sample of industrialised countries over the period 1971-2003.
26Betts and Devereux (1996) are the rst who introduce LCP to capture the idea of PTM in a
general-equilibrium approach and this draws a distinct comparison with the original assumption of
PCP in the Redux model (Obstfeld and Rogo¤, 1995), the rst benchmark model in the NOEM
literature. Bailliu and Fujii (2004) argue that in reality, these two cases coexist. On a theoretical
front, Corsetti and Pesenti (2001, 2005), for example, build a model assuming that rms are able
to react to a fraction of exchange rate movements, and therefore PCP and LCP become two special
cases.
27Another example is Corsetti and Pesenti (2004). They model incomplete pass-through endoge-
nously by assuming that rms can decide the degree of pass-through to import prices prior to the
realisation of the exchange rates.
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justication for this assumption is the example of oil, which is mainly denominated in
US dollars.28 This assumption therefore distinguishes two types of rms: one facing
foreign inputs denominated in the foreign currency (foreign PCP, hereafter type P
rms) and the other facing foreign inputs denominated in the home currency (foreign
LCP, hereafter type L rms). Firms are assumed to preset prices and currency for
their nal goods one period in advance, taking into account the currency used for
their imported inputs.
The main contribution of this paper is to relate input currency denomination
with rms invoicing currency choice for nal goods and the endogenously deter-
mined exchange rate pass-through (to consumer prices). The analysis in this paper
proceeds in three stages. In the rst stage, I show how optimal currency choice
is conducted for prot-maximising rms in pricing their nal goods. In a partial
equilibrium setting, I take as given the distribution of exchange rates, market de-
mand and prices of other rms. Up to a second order approximation, the optimal
decision rules can be established that rms simply take into account the volatility
of exchange rates and the covariance of the exchange rate with the marginal costs.29
In the second stage, a NOEM framework with back-and-forth trade is presented,
taking rmscurrency choice as given. In the third stage, by combining the previous
two, the degree of pass-through is then endogenously determined by the measures
of rms that choose PCP/LCP for the nal goods. It is then possible to discuss
how input currency denomination a¤ects rmscurrency choice and the degree of
exchange rate pass-through in a general equilibrium set-up.
The rst key result answers the question how back-and-forth trade a¤ects rms
invoicing currency choice. In the rst stage of the analysis I develop rmsdecision
rules and compare them with the case when there is no imported inputs as in
DES (2004). In a partial equilibrium set-up I show that the use of imported inputs
creates a wedge between the two types of rms in a way that type P rms have more
incentive to use LCP whereas type L rms have more incentive to use PCP, all else
being equal. In other words, rms tend to use the same currency of their imported
inputs for exports. Moreover, the higher the expenditure share on imported inputs,
the larger the wedge between the two types of rms.
The second key result answers the question how input currency denomination
a¤ects rmsinvoicing currency choice and accordingly the degree of exchange rate
pass-through. Overall the result shows that the more use of foreign currency-
denominated inputs, the lower the pass-through. Two channel are identied from
28 I later relax this assumption and present the results in Appendix 2.D.
29The rst paper that stresses the role the currency of denomination of export prices plays in
determining the correlations of prices and the exchange rate is perhaps Giovannini (1988). In his
paper, whether choosing home or foreign currency is optimal depends on whether the prot function
is convex or concave of the exchange rate, respectively.
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the general equilibrium results. The rst channel is a direct one that a change in
input currency denomination leads to a change in rm composition. An exogenous
increase in the share of inputs denominated in the foreign currency, for example,
results in more type P rms in the home country. Hence lower pass-through is
observed. The second channel is an indirect one through a two-way relationship
between exchange rate volatility and pass-through.30 A change in input currency
denomination (rm composition) rst results in a shift in currency choice behaviour
(the direct channel). This alters the degree of exchange rate pass-through and then
the exchange rate distribution. Exchange rate distribution, in turn, a¤ects rms
decision rules and generates an endogenously determined new level of pass-through.
The equilibrium results also suggest a link between the elasticity of substitution
between home and foreign intermediate goods with the degree of pass-through.
By comparing the equilibrium conditions I nd a negative relationship between the
elasticity of substitution and the equilibrium pass-through. This result relates to the
empirical evidence in the existing pass-through literature that higher pass-through
occurs for more homogenous product sectors (with lower elasticity of substitution).31
The paper is structured as follows. The next section sets out the model assump-
tions, followed by the rst-stage partial equilibrium analysis, in which rmsdecision
rules are established. Section 2.3 provides the settings of the general equilibrium
framework. Section 2.4 o¤ers the equilibrium conditions as well as the key results.
Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Back-and-forth Trade and Currency Choice
In this section, rmscurrency choice is examined in a partial equilibrium setting.
There are two countries trading both intermediate and nal goods. Firms in both
countries use imported intermediate goods as inputs for the production of nal
goods. Figure 2.1 demonstrates the trade structure.
2.2.1 Demand and Production
In the home country, the export sector contains a unit interval of rms indexed
by i and is monopolistic competitive. Each rm sells a di¤erentiated intermediate
good and a di¤erentiated nal good to the foreign country and faces CES demand
30This two-way relationship, rstly identied in DES (2004), is the key mechanism of endoge-
nous pass-through. Exchange rate volatility a¤ects rmsinvoicing behaviour, and accordingly the
degree of pass-through. The degree of aggregate pass-through, in turn, a¤ects the distribution and
volatility of exchange rates.
31See, for example, Gopinath, Itskhoki and Rigobon (2010). They examine how invoicing
currency choice a¤ects rmsprice adjustments and accordingly endogenous exchange rate pass-
through. They document higher frequencies of price adjustments and high pass-through for ho-
mogenous goods.
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Figure 2.1: A Two-country Back-and-forth Trade Structure
functions for the intermediate and nal good, respectively:
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where the X subscripts denote variables of intermediate goods and qi is the price of
the intermediate good i. Qhf is the price index for all home intermediate goods sold
in the foreign country, which is taken as given by the rm. Q is the intermediate
goods price index in the foreign country. Also, pi is the price the foreign consumer
pays for home nal good i, P hf is the price index for all home nal goods sold in
the foreign country, and P  is the foreign consumer price index. Let all prices be
denominated in the foreign currency here. X and C are foreign demand shifters
that are independent of prices. Parameters  and X are the price elasticities of
demand facing any rm i with ; X > 1. Parameters  and X are the foreign
price elasticities of demand for domestic goods.
Production of intermediate goods uses only (di¤erentiated) labour. Labour is
assumed immobile across countries. To maintain symmetry, assume that any rm
uses workers of each type. Therefore, in producing intermediate good, each rm i
in the home country follows a production function:
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where ! is the elasticity of demand between types of labour. Given a distribution of
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wages Wk, the marginal cost of producing intermediate goods is given by MCX =
1
n
R n
0 (Wk)
1 ! dk
 1
1 ! W .
In producing nal goods, each rm i uses labour together with both imported and
domestically produced intermediate goods, following a Cobb-Douglas production
technology:
Y i = A
 
Li
1  
(Xih)

 
Xifh

; (2.4)
where Xh is the amount of domestically produced intermediate goods used in the
production, and Xfh is the amount of (imported) intermediate goods used in the
production. A is a constant productivity term.32 Firms are divided into two types:
type P rms use imported inputs denominated in foreign currency (i.e. PCP by
foreign exporters) and type L rms use imported inputs denominated in home cur-
rency (i.e. LCP by foreign exporters). Given the production function, marginal
costs for type P rms and type L rms, respectively, are given by:
MC (q) = (MCX)1 
 
S  qifh

; (2.5)
MC (q) = (MCX)
1   qifh ; (2.6)
where S is the exchange rate, or home currency price of foreign currency; qifh (de-
nominated in the foreign currency) and qifh (denominated in the home currency)
are the prices facing type P and type L rms, respectively.
2.2.2 PCP versus LCP
Input currency denomination is assumed exogenous in the main analysis.33 With
this assumption we have an exogenous share of rms facing PCP/LCP inputs.
In this section I develop rmspricing and currency choice rules for their nal
goods. Firms evaluate prots and set optimal prices one period ahead, using the ex-
ogenous discount factor . If a rm uses its own currency (PCP), then the expected
discounted prot is:
EPCP = E
24  pi  MC pi
SP hf
! 
P hf
P 
 
C
35 : (2.7)
If a rm uses the foreign currency (LCP), then the expected discounted prot
32Note that home demand for imported intermediate goods is independent of domestic prices, i.e.
foreign rms face a CES demand curve for their intermediate exports taking the form as equation
(2.1).
33See Appendix 2.D for the extension case with endogenous currency choice for intermediate
goods. Since the production of intermediate goods uses labour only, the decision rule is exactly
the same as the case with no foreign inputs ( = 0): The optimal pricing for intermediate goods
follows similar forms as pricing for nal goods.
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is:
ELCP = E
24  Spi  MC pi
P hf
! 
P hf
P 
 
C
35 : (2.8)
where marginal costs MC are denominated in the home currency.34
The optimal prices which maximise the expected discounted prots, under PCP
and LCP, respectively, can be shown as:
pi =
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E (S
)
; (2.9)
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 = P ( )hf P
C:
Using the equations of prices and marginal costs, I take a second order approx-
imation of the two expected prot functions and establish rmsdecision rules.
Proposition 1 Type P rms (i.e. rms using foreign PCP inputs) choose PCP for
their nal goods if: 
1
2
  

var (s)  (1  ) cov (s; w) > 0:
Type L rms (i.e. rms using foreign LCP inputs) choose PCP for their nal goods
if:
1
2
var (s)  (1  ) cov (s; w) > 0;
where s = lnS and w = lnW:35
Proof. See Appendix 2.A.
Note that the case of  = 0 captures the model of DES (2004). Proposition 1
says that all else being equal exchange rate volatility, captured by high var (lnS),
makes the rm prefer PCP. In contrast, the covariance between exchange rates and
the home wage makes the rm prefer LCP. Below I discuss the two e¤ects in turn.
The e¤ect of exchange rate volatility enters the decision rule through the rms
consideration of expected revenues. When the rm chooses PCP, the price is stable
whereas the quantity (foreign demand) is subject to exchange rate uncertainty. On
the other hand, when the rm chooses LCP, the quantity is stable whereas the
price is subject to exchange rate uncertainty. The rm therefore faces a trade-
o¤ between stabilising price and stabilising quantity. The curvature of revenue
34Note here that the expectation takes place in period t  1 when rms set its price for period t.
The time subscripts are omitted here for the simplicity of notations.
35Note that prices of foreign inputs do not appear in the decision rules because they are pre-set
at time t  1.
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functions matters for the optimal currency choice. Technically, the expected revenue
function under PCP is convex in the exchange rate and linear under LCP. Holding
all other variables constant, an increase in the exchange rate variance increases
expected revenues under PCP relative to LCP. This channel therefore gives rms
an incentive to choose PCP.
The second channel is through the uncertainty of marginal costs. A positive
covariance between the exchange rate and marginal cost increases the expected
total costs under PCP. Take an exchange rate depreciation (higher S), for example,
under PCP rmsdemand is higher precisely when the cost of production (home
wage) is higher. This leads to higher expected total costs. Under LCP, however,
demand is independent of the exchange rate, holding other variables constant. This
channel therefore gives rms an incentive to choose LCP.
The decision rules for foreign rms are entirely analogous, given that they also
face the same CES demands and production technology.
Corollary to Proposition 1 Foreign type P rms (i.e. rms using foreign PCP
inputs) choose PCP for their nal goods if:
1
2
  

var (s) + (1  ) cov (s; w) > 0:
Foreign type L rms (i.e. rms using foreign LCP inputs) choose PCP for their
nal goods if:
1
2
var (s) + (1  ) cov (s; w) > 0;
In the following discussion, I turn to examine graphically how rms using di¤er-
ent currency-denominated inputs di¤er in their currency choice behaviour. Figure
2.2 captures rmsdecision rules developed in Proposition 1. These gures illustrate
how input currency denomination a¤ects rmscurrency choice. Figure 2.2(a) shows
the case when rms do not use any imported inputs ( = 0): High exchange rate
volatility gives rms an incentive to choose PCP whereas high covariance between
exchange rates and wage gives rms an incentive to choose LCP.
Figure 2.2(b) shows the decision rules with the use of imported inputs. The
threshold line becomes atter for rms that use PCP inputs (type P) and steeper for
rms that use LCP inputs (LCP). This suggests that input currency denomination
has a strong implication for rmscurrency choice. Given any level of exchange rate
volatility the use of imported inputs makes type P rms more likely to choose LCP
and type L rms more likely to choose PCP, compared to the initial case with no
imported inputs ( = 0).
Overall, the use of imported inputs makes rms more likely to use the same
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Figure 2.2: Decision Rules for FirmsInvoicing Currency Choice
currency of their imported inputs for exports. The intuition behind this result is
that pricing in the foreign currency provides a natural hedge for rms that use
foreign currency-denominated inputs. It can also be shown that when production
requires higher share of foreign inputs (higher ), the wedge between type P and
type L rms increases.36
2.3 The General Equilibrium Model
The model presented in this section, as the second stage of the analysis, takes as
given the measures of rmscurrency choices. The world contains a unit interval
[0; 1] of rms (households), with the fraction n in Home and 1  n in Foreign.
2.3.1 Preferences and Market Structure
The representative household k maximises the following expected utility:
Ukt = Et
 1X
s=t
s t
1
1  

Cks
1 
+  ln

Mks
Ps

  Lks
!
; (2.11)
where 0 <  < 1 and  > 0:37 MP is domestic real balance, and L is the labour
supply. C is a consumption index and can be decomposed into the consumption of
36The slope for type P rms, 1   1=2(1   ); is decreasing in : The slope for type L rms,
1=2(1  ); is increasing in :
37The elasticity of intertemporal substitution is 1=.
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home and foreign composites:
Ck =

n
1


ckh
  1

+ (1  n) 1

ckfh
  1

 
 1
; (2.12)
where  is the elasticity of substitution between composites. Home and foreign
composites are given by:
ckh =

n
 1

Z n
0

ck;ih
 1

di
 
 1
; (2.13)
ckfh =

(1  n)
 1

Z 1
n

ck;ifh
 1

di
 
 1
; (2.14)
where  is the elasticity of substitution between individual goods.
Household k has the following budget constraint:
PtC
k
t +M
k
t +B
k
t +
X
t+1x
k
t+1 =WtL
k
t +
k
t +(1+rt)B
k
t 1+M
k
t 1+T
k
t +x
k
t : (2.15)
The household consumes goods, accumulates money balances, purchases in-
ternational bonds (Bk) and state-contingent domestic bonds (xk). Income is re-
ceived from wage income, prots from home rms, interests earned on international
bonds, money held over from last period, transfers from the government and state-
contingent domestic payouts from other home residents. They choose consumption,
wage rates (given their individual monopoly power over their di¤erentiated labour),
bonds and money balances to maximise utility.
In this setting, I assume incomplete international risk sharing. Consumers can
trade abroad only in non-contingent nominal bonds. Within the domestic economy,
however, I assume full risk sharing across households. This eliminates the specic
uncertainty in wage income across types of households.
The domestic price index is given by:
Pt =
h
nP 1 ht + (1  n)P 1 fht
i 1
1 
; (2.16)
where Ph and Pfh represent the price index of domestic goods and foreign goods
sold in home country, respectively:
Pht =
"
1
n
Z zn
0
 
piht(q
)
1 
di+
1
n
Z n
zn
 
piht(q)
1 
di
# 1
1 
; (2.17)
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Pfht =
266666664
1
1 n
R n+vz(1 n)
n

St  pifht(q)
1 
di
+ 11 n
R n+z(1 n)
n+vz(1 n)

pifht(q)
1 
di
+ 11 n
R n+z(1 n)+u(1 z)(1 n)
n+z(1 n)

St  pifht(q)
1 
di
+ 11 n
R 1
n+z(1 n)+u(1 z)(1 n)

pifht(q
)
1 
di
377777775
1
1 
; (2.18)
where z (z) is the fraction of domestic (foreign) rms that engage in PCP for
intermediate goods. v is the fraction of foreign rms that choose PCP for nal
goods, among all foreign rms facing home PCP intermediate goods. u is the
fraction of foreign rms that choose PCP for nal goods, among all foreign rms
facing home LCP intermediate goods.
2.3.2 Equilibrium Conditions
A systematic equilibrium is a collection of allocations fC;C;W;W ;M;M; B;Bg,
and a price system
n
P; P ; Q;Q; Ph; P f ; Phf ; Pfh; S
o
such that:
 Given the price system, fC;C;W;W ;M;M; B;B; x; xg maximise each
consumers utility, subject to the budget constraint.

n
Q;Q; Ph; P f ; Phf ; Pfh
o
maximise each rms expected prots, and each
rms strategies of invoicing currency for both intermediate and nal goods
are optimal.
 The goods, labour and money markets are clear.
The equations of the model are shown in Table 2.1. Table 2.1(a) shows the
optimal conditions for the consumer and the rm. Each worker (consumer) sets the
wage as a markup over the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and
leisure. A fraction  of the total workers set wages ex-post (i.e. exible wages),
after the state of the world is realised, whereas the rest 1    workers set wages
ex-ante (i.e. xed wages). Such setting allows for wage stickiness. The nominal
discounted factor is dened here as t 1 = 

Ct 1Pt 1
Ct Pt

: Table 2.1(b) shows the
wage and price indexes. Table 2.1(c) describes the market clearing relationships.
2.3.3 Model Solutions
Here I assume that the exogenous money stock in each country follows a random
walk in logs:
lnMt+1 = lnMt + t+1; Et(t+1) = 0:
The model is solved by linear approximation around an initial non-stochastic
equilibrium. The full derivations of the model solutions are shown in Appendix
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Table 2.1: Equations of the Model
(a): Optimal conditions for the consumer and the rm
First order conditions and wages:
Euler equation: C
 
t
Pt
=  (1 + rt+1)Et
C t+1
Pt+1
Flexible wage: wflet =
!
! 1PtC

t L
Money demand: MtPt = C

t
1+rt+1
rt+1
Fixed wage: wfixt =
!
! 1
Et 1

Lft

Et 1
 
L
f
t
PtC

t
!
Intermediate goods prices: Final goods prices:
Home: qht =
X
X 1
Et 1(Wtt 1Xht)
Et 1(t 1Xht)
Home: pht=  1
Et 1(MCtt 1Cht)
Et 1(t 1Cht)
PCP: qhft=
X
X 1
Et 1

WtSXt 
X

Et 1

S
X
t 
X
 PCP: phft=  1 Et 1(MCtSt 
)Et 1(St 
)
LCP: qhft=
X
X 1
Et 1(Wt
X)
Et 1(St
X)
LCP: phft=

 1
Et 1(MCt
)
Et 1(St
)
Denitions: 
X = t 1Q
(X X)
hft Q
X
t X

t ; 
 = t 1P
( )
hft P

t C

t
(b) Price and wage indexes
Qt=
h
nQ1 Xht +(1  n)Q1 Xfht
i 1
1 X
Pt=
h
nP 1 ht +(1  n)P 1 fht
i 1
1 
(CPI)
Wt=



wflet
1 !
+ (1  )

wfixt
1 ! 11 !
(c) Market equilibrium
Employment (exible wage): Lflet = 

wflet
Wt
 !  YX;ht+zY X;hft+(1  z)Y x;hft
+Yht+Y hft+(1  )Y hft

Employment (xed wage): Lfixt = (1  )

wfixt
Wt
 !  YX;ht+zY X;hft+(1  z)Y x;hft
+Yht+Y hft+(1  )Y hft

Intermediate goods home sales: YX;ht= n

Qht
Qt
 X
Xt
Intermediate goods foreign sales (PCP): YX;hft= (1  n)

qhft
StQhft
 X Qhft
Qt
 X
Xt
Intermediate goods foreign sales (LCP): Y X;hft= (1  n)

qhft
Qhft
 X Qhft
Qt
 X
Xt
Final goods home sales: Yht= n

pht
Pt
 
Ct
Final goods foreign sales (PCP): Yhft= (1  n)

phft
SP hft
  P hft
P t
 
Ct
Final goods foreign sales (LCP): Y hft= (1  n)

phft
P hft
  P hft
P t
 
Ct
Balance of payments:
PtCt+Bt+1+QtXt= (1 + rt)Bt+QhtYX;ht+zqhftYX;hft
+(1  z)

Stq

hft

Y X;hft+P htYht+phftYhft+(1  )StphftY hft
Denitions:  = vz+u  uz,  = vz + u uz
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2.B. Here xt+j = lnXt+j  Et 1 (lnXt+j) = bxt+j  Et 1 (bxt+j) is dened as the log
deviation from time t 1 expectation for any variable Xt+j , j  0. First, we can take
the money market equilibrium for the home country and the analogous conditions
for the foreign country, and then linearise the equations. Taking di¤erences, we get:
ct   ct =
1

f(mt  mt )  [n + (1  n)] stg ; (2.19)
where  = vz + u   uz and  = vz + u   uz can be interpreted as weighted
degrees of pass-through, taking into account the imported inputs incorporated in
total exports and the exported inputs in total imports. When there is full pass-
through of exchange rates into prices, i.e. v = v = u = u = 1 and  =  = 1,
PPP holds at all times and the above equation simply represents a monetary model
of the exchange rate. On the other hand, when v = v = u = u = 0 and  =  = 0,
it represents the case of zero pass-through, where shocks to relative consumption
are only dependent on shocks to relative money supplies.
Using the period t+1 balance of payment condition, labour market and product
market clearing equations, we get:38
Et(ct+1   ct+1) +
Et(Xt+1  Xt+1)

=
r


dBt+1
(1  n)P C

; (2.20)
where  = 1 + (   ) (1     ) and r is the steady-state interest rate. Before
discussing the relationship between the relative consumption level and the relative
demand for imported intermediate goods, here the term Et(Xt+1 Xt+1) is kept in
order to make comparisons with the DES (2004). Their result simply shows that
an increase in net foreign assets must be accompanied by an increase in relative
consumption levels. In comparison, the e¤ect of an increase in net foreign assets (i.e.
capital account decit) is spread over higher relative consumption and higher relative
demand for imported intermediate goods (in order to produce more outputs).
From the home and foreign Euler equations, we can obtain the following condi-
tion:
Et(ct+1   ct+1) = (ct   ct ) 
(1  n   (1  n))

st: (2.21)
This equation shows the e¤ect of exchange rate shocks on relative consumption
growth. An exchange rate depreciation, for example, reduces the expected con-
sumption growth in the home country relative to the foreign country.
Next, I will show the relationship between the relative consumption level and
the relative demand for imported intermediate goods. Using the prot-maximising
38Also, using the notation dBt+1 = Bt+1  Bt.
Chapter 2. Back-and-forth Trade, Currency Choice and Pass-through 25
conditions with the production function we get:
Et(Xt+1  Xt+1) = 0Et(ct+1   ct+1): (2.22)
where 0 =  [(1  ) (1     ) + 1] : In this equation, all else being equal, whether
an increase in relative consumption level is accompanied by higher or lower rela-
tive demand for imported intermediate goods depends on the degrees of dependence
both countries have on each other.
We may put (2.19) to (2.22) together and get:
st =

1 + 1+r

(mt  mt )

; (2.23)
where =

1 + 1+r

+(  1) [1  n   (1  n)] +X [(1  n)z + nz]> 0. The
response of the exchange rate to unanticipated money shocks depends on the elas-
ticity of demand for home goods, the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution and
the degrees of exchange rate pass-through. Equation (2.23) shows that the degree
of aggregate pass-through a¤ects the distribution of exchange rates. In the previous
section, I show that exchange rate volatility enters rmsdecision rules for currency
choice and thus a¤ects the degree of pass-through. Hence there is a two-way rela-
tionship between the movement of exchange rates and the degree of pass-through.
2.4 EquilibriumCurrency Choice and Endogenous Pass-
through
In this section I combine the analyses in the previous two sections and discuss the
determination of equilibrium pass-through. Note that input currency denomination
is predetermined and exogenous (xed z and z).39 To incorporate rmsdecision
rules I rst dene a function (z; z; v; v; u; u; 2 ; 2) as the relative benets of
pricing nal goods in LCP relative to PCP. These functions for type P and type L
rms, respectively, are given by:
P (z; z
; v; v; u; u; 2 ; 
2
) = (1  ) covt 1 (st; wt) 

1
2
  

vart 1 (st) ;
L(z; z
; v; v; u; u; 2 ; 
2
) = (1  ) covt 1 (st; wt ) 
1
2
vart 1 (st) :
Similarly, (z; z; v; v; u; u; 2 ; 2) is dened as the benet function for for-
39 In Appendix 2.D I show that the decision rule for intermediate goods is exactly the same as the
case with no foreign inputs ( = 0): X(z; z; v; v; u; u; 2 ; 
2
) = covt 1 (st; wt)  12vart 1 (st) :
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eign rms:
P (z; z
; v; v; u; u; 2 ; 
2
) =  (1  )covt 1 (st; wt ) 

1
2
  

vart 1 (st) ;
L(z; z
; v; v; u; u; 2 ; 
2
) =  (1  )covt 1 (st; wt ) 
1
2
vart 1 (st) :
Table 2.2 uses the model solutions to dene the conditional variances of the
exchange rate and the covariances between the exchange rate and marginal costs.
Table 2.2: Conditional Variances and Covariances
vart 1(st)
(1+ 1+r )
2
(2+2 2)
2
covt 1 (st; wt) covt 1

st; w
fle
t

covt 1

st; w
fle
t

covt 1 (st; t) =
(1+ 1+r )(
2
 2)

covt 1 (st; wt ) covt 1

st; w
fle
t

covt 1

st; w
fle
t

covt 1 (st; t ) =
(1+ 1+r )(
2
 2)

 =
( 
1 + 1+r

+(  1) [1  n   (1  n)]
+X [(1  n)z + nz]
)
2.4.1 The Equilibrium: A Symmetric Case
In the following analysis I focus on a symmetric case where countries are identical in
all aspects with identical monetary policy, and same types of rms in both countries
follow the same pricing strategies.40 In the symmetric case, each type of rms either
chooses PCP, LCP or indi¤erent between pricing in the home or foreign currencies.
Therefore we have nine candidates for a symmetric equilibrium:
(A) PCP for type P (P < 0) and PCP for type L (L < 0).
(B) PCP for type P (P < 0) and LCP for type L (L > 0).
(C) PCP for type P (P < 0) and mixed for type L (L = 0).
40 In the symmetric case covt 1 (st; wt ) =  covt 1 (st; wt) and  = :
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(D) LCP for type P (P > 0) and PCP for type L (L < 0).
(E) LCP for type P (P > 0) and LCP for type L (L > 0).
(F) LCP for type P (P > 0) and mixed for type L (L = 0).
(G) Mixed for type P (P = 0) and PCP for type L (L < 0).
(H) Mixed for type P (P = 0) and LCP for type L (L > 0).
(I) Mixed for type P (P = 0) and mixed for type L (L = 0).
To establish the existence of a unique equilibrium, I evaluate the  functions at
each value of v and u; using Table 2.2. In the symmetric case:
P (z; v; u; 
2
 )n

 

1  


+

1  

~+ [(  1)(1  ) + X z] ; (2.24)
L(z; v; u; 
2
 )n

 

1  


  
1  

~+ [(  1)(1  ) + X z] ; (2.25)
where n denotes "proportional to" and ~  1 + 1+r . Firmsdecision rules depend
on the weighted pass-through ; the measure of PCP inputs z; the consumption
elasticity , the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign inputs X and
the share of ex-post wage setters : When there is no use of foreign inputs ( = 0),
rmsdecision rules are identical.
By evaluating their benet functions ; each rm has to choose a currency for
their nal goods. In any unique equilibrium, the strategy taken by each type of
rm has to be the best response to the others, such that no rm has an incentive
to deviate.
Using (2.24) and (2.25) I establish the following proposition.
Proposition 2 In the symmetric case, the only unique equilibrium is:
(a) Full exchange rate pass-through if
X <
~
z

1  

  
1  

    1

; when  > 1
X <
~
z

1  

  
1  

; when  < 1:
This is case (A) with symmetric PCP (u = v =  = 1).41
41Note also 1 

> 
1  :
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(b) Zero exchange rate pass-through if
X >
~
z

1  

+

1  

    1

; when  > 1;
X >
~
z

1  

+

1  

+
1  
z
; when  < 1:
This is case (E) with symmetric LCP (u = v =  = 0).
(c) Incomplete exchange rate pass-through otherwise. The equilibrium degree of pass-
through is:
(c-i)  = 1  z if
~
z

1  

  
1  

< X <
~
z

1  

+

1  

    1
z
;
when  > 1;
~
z

1  

  
1  

+
1  

< X <
~
z

1  

+

1  

+
1  

;
when  < 1:
This is case (D) where all type P rms use LCP ( v = 0) and all type L rms
use PCP (u = 1) and  = vz + u  uz = 1  z.
(c-ii)  = 1  X z1  + ~1 

1 
 +

1 

if
 < 1 and
~
z

1  

+

1  

+
1  

< X <
~
z

1  

+

1  

+
1  
z
;
This is case (F) where all type P rms use LCP ( v = 0) and all type L rms
are indi¤erent. There is a u 2 (0; 1) such that L = 0:
u =
1
1  z

1  X z
1   +
~
1  

1  

+

1  

:
(c-iii)  = 1  X z1  + ~1 

1 
   1 

if
 < 1 and
~
z

1  

  
1  

< X <
~
z

1  

  
1  

+
1  

;
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This is case (G) where all type P rms are indi¤erent and all type L rms use
PCP (u = 1). There is a v 2 (0; 1) such that P = 0:
v = 1  X
1   +
~
(1  )z

1  

  
1  

:
Proof. See Appendix 2.C.
In equilibrium (a), both types of rms have an incentive to set prices in their
own currencies (PCP), whatever others do. For symmetric PCP to be the unique
equilibrium, both the consumption elasticity  and the elasticity of substitution
between home and foreign inputs X have to be small enough (both positive). The
equilibrium conditions show that if  is greater than 1, there is a stricter condition
for X (to be even smaller). This is because lower  and X lead to a higher
exchange rate volatility.42 As a result, rms have more incentive to choose PCP
and symmetric PCP is more likely to be the unique equilibrium. In the equilibrium,
both countries have full exchange rate pass-through.
In equilibrium (b), both types of rms have an incentive to set prices in the
foreign currencies (LCP), whatever others do. For symmetric LCP to be the unique
equilibrium, X has to be high enough.
In equilibrium (c), we have incomplete exchange rate pass-through with three
possible outcomes. In (c-i) all rms use the same currency of their foreign inputs for
exports, i.e. type P rms use LCP and type L rms use PCP. Therefore the degree
of pass-through is exactly the share of type L rms (1   z). In (c-ii) and (c-iii)
the degree of pass-through depends on the elasticities  and X ; the (exogenous)
measure of PCP inputs z; the degree of wage stickiness  and the expenditure share
of imported inputs :
These results show how input currency denomination a¤ects rms currency
choice and accordingly the equilibrium degree of pass-through (the relationship be-
tween z and ). Also, we can examine the relationship between the elasticity of
substitution and pass-through systematically. I discuss these results in the next
subsections.
Note that in (c-ii) and (c-iii) there is a positive relationship between the degree
of wage stickiness and the degree of pass-through: the stickier the wages (smaller
), the higher the pass-through (higher ).43 Recall the analysis in Section 2.2 (see
42See var(st) in 2.2 as a function of  and X . It can be shown that @var(st)=@ < 0 and
@var(st)=@X < 0: This result is consistent with the results of DES (2004).
43Compared to DES (2004), the use of intermediate goods brings about an extra result: when
all wages are adjusted ex-post ( = 1), the symmetric PCP equilibrium does not hold because X
cannot be negative.
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Figure 2.2) which shows that an increase in  makes type P rms more likely to
use LCP (which leads to lower pass-through) and type L rms more likely to use
PCP (which leads to higher pass-through). Therefore, the overall e¤ect of  on
pass-through is ambiguous depending on which e¤ect dominates.
The reason why the other candidates cannot hold as the unique equilibrium is
shown technically in Appendix D. Intuitively, this is because in any state of the
world type L rms are less likely to use LCP (L < P for given levels z; v; u; 2 )
than type P rms. When all type P rms use PCP, it is impossible for type L rms
to use LCP or stay indi¤erent. Hence case (B) and (C) are ruled out. Similarly, if
type P rms are indi¤erent, it is impossible for type L rms to use LCP only. Hence
case (H) is ruled out. For case (I) to hold as a unique equilibrium it requires that
both types of rms are indi¤erent between the two currencies. This is only possible
when  = 0:
2.4.2 Input Currency Denomination and Equilibrium Pass-through
From the equilibrium results in Proposition 2 we can examine how input currency
denomination a¤ects rmscurrency choice and accordingly the equilibrium degree
of pass-through. In the following analysis I focus on the cases with incomplete
pass-through (equilibrium (c)).
The results show that a change in the measure of PCP inputs z directly alters
the degree of pass-through through rmscurrency choice for nal goods. To see
this, consider an example with an increase in z for the home country. In (c-i)
this directly translates into lower pass-through since more (type P) rms now use
LCP. This is the direct channel through which input currency denomination a¤ects
pass-through.
There is a second indirect channel through the two-way relationship between
exchange rates and pass-through shown in (2.23). In (c-ii) when all type L rms
are indi¤erent between the two currencies, an increase in z leads to a decrease in
the equilibrium share of PCP choice u. Similarly, in (c-iii) when all type P rms
are indi¤erent between the two currencies, an increase in z leads to a decrease in
the equilibrium share of PCP choice v. Any change of z rst a¤ects the degree of
pass-through (through the change of rm composition), which alters the distribution
of exchange rate. Exchange rate changes, in turn, a¤ects rmsdecision rules and
hence determines a new level of equilibrium pass-through.
Overall the degree of pass-through is decreasing in the measure of PCP inputs
for all three equilibrium cases with incomplete pass-through.44 This result suggests
that input currency denomination has strong implications for the degree of pass-
44Note that @=@z < 0 in all three cases.
Chapter 2. Back-and-forth Trade, Currency Choice and Pass-through 31
through. The more an industry or a country is dependent on imported inputs priced
in the foreign currency, the lower the degree of pass-through.
2.4.3 Elasticity of Substitution and Equilibrium Pass-through
The equilibrium conditions also provide some insight on the link between the elas-
ticity of substitution and pass-through. Graphing all the equilibrium conditions
together I get a negative relationship between the elasticity of substitution between
home and foreign intermediate goods X and the equilibrium pass-through.45 This
result comes from comparing the conditions for X and the equilibrium pass-through
 in the 5 equilibrium cases.
2.5 Concluding Remarks
This paper extends the general equilibrium framework of Devereux, Engel and Stor-
gaard (2004) by allowing for trade in intermediate goods in a two-country model
with endogenous exchange rate pass-through. The main contribution of the paper is
to identify the link between input currency denomination and endogenous exchange
rate pass-through through rmscurrency choice for nal goods.
The equilibrium results show a negative relationship between the share of inputs
denominated in the foreign currency and the degree of exchange rate pass-through.
This happens through 2 channels: (i) A direct channel through the change of rm
composition. When more rms face PCP inputs (type P), for example, pass-through
is lower because type P rms are more likely to use LCP compared to type L rms;
(ii) an indirect channel through exchange rate changes which alter rmsdecision
rules for nal goods and in turn the degree of pass-through. Another key result
of the paper is that a higher elasticity of substitution between home and foreign
intermediate goods is associated with lower equilibrium pass-through.
Empirical evidence has shown that in the UK pass-through to domestic prices
exhibits signicant heterogeneity across UK industries. The manufacturing and raw
materials sectors, for example, have much higher pass-through than the energy sec-
tor. (Mumtaz, Oomen and Wang, 2006) One possible direction for future empirical
work is to examine whether this can be attributed to di¤erent uses of imported
inputs and accordingly di¤erent currency behaviours across industries.
45The graph is not reported but available upon request.
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2.A Proof of Proposition 1
In this appendix I provide a proof of rmsdecision rules developed in Proposition
1. Following the solution technique of Devereux et al. (2004), I drop the subscript
i for simplicity. From (2.7) and (2.9), the expected discounted prots under PCP
are given as:
EPCP =
 

  1
E
 
MC  S

E (S
)
!1 
E
h
S

i
 
 

  1
E
 
MC  S

E (S
)
! 
E
h
MC  S

i
= eE hS
iE hMC  S
i1  ; (A-1)
where e = 1 1   1  ; 
 = P ( )hf P C: Note that (A-1) su¢ ces because
prices are preset one period in advance, i.e. Et 1(Pt) = Pt: This expression may
also be rewritten as:
e [E exp( lnS) exp (ln
)] [E exp(lnMC) exp( lnS) exp(ln
)]1  : (A-2)
In the next step, I take a second order approximation for the rst term:
E exp( lnS) exp (ln
)  exp(E lnS) exp(E ln
)

"
1 + 
2
2 var(lnS) +
1
2var(ln
)
+cov(ln
; lnS)
#
: (A-3)
Using the same approximation for E exp(lnMC) exp( lnS) exp(ln
), we get an
approximation for EPCP :


1 +
2
2
var(lnS) +
1
2
var(ln
) + cov(ln
; lnS)


"
1 + 12var(lnMC) +
2
2 var(lnS) +
1
2var(ln
)
+cov(lnMC; lnS) + cov(lnMC; ln
) + cov(lnS; ln
)
#1 
: (A-4)
where  = e exp(E lnS) exp(E ln
) exp [(1  )E lnMC] : Taking logs and using
the approximation ln(1 + x)  x, the expected discounted prots thus become:
lnEPCP  ln + 
2
2
var(lnS) +
1
2
var(ln
) +
1  
2
var(lnMC)
+
"
cov(lnS; ln
) + (1  )cov(lnMC; lnS)
+(1  )cov(lnMC; ln
)
#
: (A-5)
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Now, from (2.8) and (2.10), the expected discounted prots under LCP are given
as:
ELCP = eE [S
]E [MC  
]1  : (A-6)
Using the same approximation, they may be written as:
lnELCP  ln + 
2
var(lnS) +
1
2
var(ln
) +
1  
2
var(lnMC)
+ [cov(lnS; ln
) + (1  )cov(lnMC; ln
)] : (A-7)
Now, we can compare (A-5) and (A-7) and get the following condition for EPCP >
ELCP to hold:
1
2
var (s)  cov (s;mc) > 0; (A-8)
where s = ln(S); and mc = ln(MC): Substituting in the equations of marginal
costs, (2.5) and (2.6), proposition 1 follows. Note that prices of foreign inputs do
not appear in the decision rules because they are preset at time t  1
2.B Solution Technique
The technique used to solve the system is a linear approximation around an initial
symmetric steady state where next foreign assets are zero, all prices are equal and
the exchange rate is unity. Dene bxt = lnXt lnX as a log deviation from the initial
steady state. Also, dene xt+j = bxt+j   Et 1bxt+j as the unexpected component of
the deviation from the initial steady state. The linearised versions of the pricing
equations are:
bqhft = Et 1 bwt, bqhft = Et 1( bwt   bst);bqfht = Et 1( bwt + bst), bqfht = Et 1 bwt ;
bpht(q) = bpht(q) = (1  )Et 1 bwt + Et 1 bwt + Et 1bst;bphft(q) = bphft(q) = (1  )Et 1 bwt + Et 1 bwt + Et 1bst;bphft(q) = bphft(q) = (1  )Et 1 bwt + Et 1 bwt   (1  )Et 1bst;
bpft(q) = bpft(q) = (1  )Et 1 bwt + Et 1 bwt   Et 1bst;bpfht(q) = bpfht(q) = (1  )Et 1 bwt + Et 1 bwt   Et 1bst;
bpfht(q) = bpfht(q) =
"
(1  )Et 1 bwt + Et 1 bwt
+(1  )Et 1bst
#
:
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Also, we can calculate the price indexes:
bQt = n bQht + (1  n) bQfht
=
"
nEt 1 bwt + (1  n)Et 1 bwt
+(1  n)(1  z)Et 1bst + (1  n)zbst
#
;
bQt = n bQhft + (1  n) bQft
=
"
nEt 1 bwt + (1  n)Et 1 bwt
 n(1  z)Et 1bst   nzbst
#
;
bpt = nbpht + (1  n)bpfht
= n ((1  )Et 1 bwt + Et 1 bwt + Et 1bst)
+(1  n)
"
(1  )Et 1 bwt + Et 1 bwt
+(1     )Et 1bst + bst
#
; (B-1)
bpt = nbphft + (1  n)bpft
= n
"
(1  )Et 1 bwt + Et 1 bwt
 (1     )Et 1bst    (bst)
#
+(1  n)((1  )Et 1 bwt + Et 1 bwt   Et 1bst): (B-2)
Linearising the Euler equations and the money market clearing conditions gives:
bpt + bct = Et(bpt+1 + bct+1); (B-3)bpt + bct = Et(bpt+1 + bct+1); (B-4)bmt   bpt = bct; (B-5)bmt   bpt = bct : (B-6)
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Linearising the balance of payment condition gives:
bct + d bBt+1
P C
+
 bQt + bXt   bpt = (1 + r) d bBt
P C
+ n
bYX;ht + bQht
+ (1  n)
2664
 bQt + bXt + bst   bpt+ (1  X) bQhft   bQt
+z(1  X)(bqhft   bQhft   bst)
+(1  z)(1  X)(bqhft   bQhft)
3775
+ n [bct + (1  ) (bpht   bpt)]
+ (1  n)
8>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>:

2664
(1  )
bphft   bst   bphft
+(1  )
bphft   bpt
+(bst + bpt   bpt) + bct
3775
+(1  )
2664
(1  )
bphft   bphft
+(1  )
bphft   bpt
+(bst + bpt   bpt) + bct
3775
9>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>;
: (B-7)
Finally, linearising the labour supply schedules for both exible and xed wage
sectors gives:
bwflet = bpt + bct + 'blflet ; (B-8)bwfixt = Et 1 bpt + bct + 'blfixt  ; (B-9)
bwflet = bpt + bct + 'blflet ; (B-10)bwfixt = Et 1 bpt + bct + 'blfixt  : (B-11)
To get (2.19) of the text, use (B-5) and (B-6), together with (B-1) and (B-2),
and the denition xt = bxt   Et 1bxt.
To get (2.20) of the text, rstly use the balance of payment condition (B-7),
substituting in the pricing equations, and taking expectations dated t  1, gives:
Et 1(bct   bct ) + Et 1( bXt   bXt ) =
"
rd bBt
(1 n)P C + [(1  )(1     )]
Et 1 ( bwt   bwt   bst)
#
: (B-12)
Doing the same for the employment equations of both home and foreign, gives:
Et 1(blt   blt ) =   [X + (1     )]Et 1 ( bwt   bwt   bst) : (B-13)
Noting that in expected terms of the linear approximation, employment and wages
of both types of workers are the same. Finally, doing the same for the labour supply
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equations gives:
Et 1( bwt   bwt   bst) = Et 1(bct   bct ) + 'Et 1(blt   blt ): (B-14)
From (B-13) and (B-14), we get:
Et 1( bwt   bwt   bst) = 1 + ' [X +  (1     )]Et 1(bct   bct ): (B-15)
Combining (B-12) and (B-15) and updating to period t (also using the fact that
Et 1d bBt+1 = d bBt) we get (2.20) of the text.
To get (2.22) of the text, take the prot-maximising conditions for both domestic
and foreign rms:
Xfh =
rPY
Qfh
;
Xhf =
rP Y 
Qhf
;
where PY (P Y ) represents total sales of home (foreign )nal goods. Linearising
these equations and taking di¤erences gives:
Et 1( bXt   bXt ) = [1 + (1  )(1     )]Et 1 ( bwt   bwt   bst) : (B-16)
Combining (B-15) and (B-16), we get (2.22) of the text.
2.C Proof of Proposition 2
In order to examine the 9 candidates for a unique equilibrium, we need the equilib-
rium conditions for di¤erent types of rms. Given what others do, if  > 0 (< 0),
rms choose LCP(PCP). If  = 0; rms are indi¤erent between the two options.
Below I discuss the conditions for each case.
Case (A)
For type P rms:
(P.1) When others PCP (v = 1; u = 1 and  = 1), P < 0 :

1    
1  


~+ X z < 0:
(P.2) When others LCP (v = 0; u = 1 and  = 1  z), P < 0 :

1    
1  


~+ [(  1)z + X z] < 0:
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For type L rms:
(L.1) When others PCP (u = 1; v = 1 and  = 1), L < 0 :  
1    
1  


~+ X z < 0:
(L.2) When others LCP (u = 0; v = 1 and  = z), L < 0 :  
1    
1  


~+ [(  1) (1  z) + X z] < 0:
The optimal strategies described above are taken regardless of what other rms do.
In (P.1), for example, the condition says that when all others choose PCP, PCP is
the optimal choice. (P.2) says that when all others choose LCP, PCP is still the
optimal choice. This guarantees that no rm has an incentive to deviate. Solving
the equilibrium yields the conditions in Proposition 2 (a).
Case (B)
For type P rms:
(P.1) When others PCP (v = 1; u = 0 and  = z), P < 0:
(P.2) When others LCP (v = 0; u = 0 and  = 0), P < 0:
For type L rms:
(L.1) When others PCP (u = 0; v = 1 and  = z), L > 0:
(L.2) When others LCP (u = 1; v = 1 and  = 1), L > 0:
There is contradiction in the conditions.
Case (C)
For type P rms:
(P.1) When others PCP (v = 1; u = u and  = z + u (1  z)), P < 0:
(P.2) When others LCP (v = 0; u = u and  = u (1  z)), P < 0:
For type L rms:
(L.1) When others PCP (u = 1; v = 1 and  = 1), L > 0:
(L.2) When others LCP (u = 0; v = 1 and  = z), L < 0:
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There is a contradiction in the conditions.
Case (D)
For type P rms:
(P.1) When others LCP (v = 0; u = 1 and  = 1  z), P > 0 :

1    
1  


~+ [(  1)z + X z] > 0
(P.2) When others LCP (v = 1; u = 1 and  = 1), P > 0 :

1    
1  


~+ X z > 0
For type L rms:
(L.1) When others PCP (u = 1; v = 0 and  = 1  z), L < 0 :  
1    
1  


~+ [(  1)z + X z] < 0
(L.2) When others LCP (u = 0; v = 0 and  = 0), L < 0 :  
1    
1  


~+ [(  1) + X z] < 0
Solving the equilibrium yields the conditions in Proposition 2 (c-i). In equilibrium
v = 0 and u = 1:Using the denition of pass-through  = vz + u (1  z) we can
derive the equilibrium pass-through as  = 1  z:
Case (E)
For type P rms:
(P.1) When others LCP (v = 0; u = 0 and  = 0), P > 0 :

1    
1  


~+ [(  1) + X z] > 0:
(P.2) When others PCP (v = 1; u = 0 and  = z), P > 0 :

1    
1  


~+ [(  1) (1  z) + X z] > 0:
For type L rms:
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(L.1) When others LCP (u = 0; v = 0 and  = 0), L > 0 :  
1    
1  


~+ [(  1) + X z] > 0:
(L.2) When others LCP (u = 1; v = 0 and  = 1  z), L > 0 :  
1    
1  


~+ [(  1)z + X z] > 0:
Solving the equilibrium yields the conditions in Proposition 2 (b).
Case (F)
For type P rms:
(P.1) When others LCP (v = 0; u = u and  = u (1  z)), P > 0 :

1    
1  


~+ [(  1) (1  u (1  z)) + X z] > 0:
(P.2) When others PCP (v = 1; u = u and  = z + u (1  z)), P > 0 :

1    
1  


~+ [(  1) (1  z) (1  u) + X z] > 0:
For type L rms:
(L.1) When others LCP (u = 0; v = 0 and  = 0), L < 0 :  
1    
1  


~+ [(  1) + X z] < 0:
(L.2) When others LCP (u = 1; v = 0 and  = 1  z), L > 0 :  
1    
1  


~+ [(  1)z + X z] > 0:
Solving the equilibrium yields the conditions in Proposition 2 (c-ii). Also there
exists a u such that L(v = 0;  = u (1  z)) = 0 :
u =
1
(1  z)

1  1
(  1)


1   +
1  


~+
X z
(  1)

:
Using this equation and  = vz + u (1  z) we can derive the equilibrium pass-
through:
 = 1  X z
1   +
1
1  


1   +
1  


~:
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Case (G)
For type P rms:
(P.1) When others LCP (v = 0; u = 1 and  = 1  z), P < 0 :

1    
1  


~+ [(  1)z + X z] < 0:
(P.2) When others PCP (v = 1; u = 1 and  = 1), P > 0 :

1    
1  


~+ X z > 0:
For type L rms:
(L.1) When others LCP (u = 0; v = v and  = vz), L < 0 :  
1    
1  


~+ [(  1) (1  vz) + X z] < 0:
(L.2) When others LCP (u = 1; v = v and  = vz + 1  z), L < 0 :  
1    
1  


~+ [(  1)z (1  v) + X z] < 0:
Solving the equilibrium yields the conditions in Proposition 2 (c-iii). Also there
exists a v such that P (u = 1;  = vz + 1  z) = 0 :
v = 1 +
X
(  1) +
1
(  1)z


1    
1  


~:
Case (H)
For type P rms:
(P.1) When others LCP (v = 0; u = 0 and  = 0), P < 0:
(P.2) When others PCP (v = 1; u = 0 and  = z), P > 0:
For type L rms:
(L.1) When others LCP (u = 0; v = v and  = vz), L > 0:
(L.2) When others LCP (u = 1; v = v and  = vz + 1  z), L > 0:
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There is a contradiction in the conditions.
Case (I)
For type P rms:
(P.1) When others LCP (v = 0; u = u and  = u (1  z)), P < 0:
(P.2) When others PCP (v = 1; u = u and  = z + u (1  z)), P > 0:
For type L rms:
(L.1) When others LCP (u = 0; v = v and  = vz), L < 0:
(L.2) When others LCP (u = 1; v = v and  = vz + 1  z), L > 0:
This equilibrium only exists if  = 0. The equilibrium pass-through can be shown
as:
 =

1 +
1
  1

 

1  


~+
X z
  1 :
Q.E.D.
2.D Extension: Currency Choice for Intermediate Goods
If we allow for rms to also preset a currency for their intermediate goods, the
decision rule would be:
X(z; z
; v; v; u; u; 2 ; 
2
) = covt 1 (st; wt) 
1
2
vart 1 (st) :
X(z; z
; v; v; u; u; 2 ; 
2
) =  covt 1 (st; wt ) 
1
2
vart 1 (st) :
In an symmetric case the benets function (of LCP relative to PCP) can be
shown as:
X(z; v; u; 
2
 )n ( ~)

1  


+ (  1)(1  ) + X z:
In this case all rms have to be indi¤erent between the two options. This is
because I focus on a symmetric case. If all rms PCP we have a model of DES
(2004) and if all rms LCP it is as if we have a model with no imported inputs
( = 0). There is a z 2 (0; 1) such that X = 0: Adding these conditions to the 5
unique equilibrium cases yields the equilibrium z:
(a) Full exchange rate pass-through ( = 1): z = ~X
1 
 :
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(b) Zero exchange rate pass-through ( = 0): z = 1X
h
~

1 


  (  1)
i
:
(c-i) Incomplete exchange rate pass-through ( = 1  z): z = ~

1 


[(  1) + X ] 1 :
Case (c-ii) and (c-iii) are ruled out because they can only be an equilibrium
when  = 0:
Chapter 3
Imported Inputs and Invoicing
Currency Choice: Theory and
Evidence from UK Transaction
Data
3.1 Introduction
When selling to a foreign market, an exporter can invoice the transaction in its
own currency (producer currency pricing or PCP), in the currency of the destina-
tion country (local currency pricing or LCP) or in the currency of a third country
(vehicle currency pricing or VCP). The choice of invoicing currency directly a¤ects
how domestic prices respond to changes in exchange rates. Hence, from a pol-
icy perspective, it has far-ranging implications for the international transmission
of macroeconomic shocks, the e¤ectiveness of monetary policy, and the choice of
exchange rate regimes. While most studies treat the choice of invoicing currency
as exogenous when examining its macroeconomic implications, the current paper
focuses instead on the determinants of invoicing currency choice.46
More precisely, this paper examines how exporting rms dependence on im-
ported inputs a¤ects their invoicing currency choice. Are there marked di¤erences
in invoicing currency choice between exporters that use imported inputs and ex-
porters that do not? When choosing an invoicing currency, do exporting rms take
into account the currency used for their imported inputs? These questions are of
particular interest as trade in intermediate inputs is an important empirical regu-
larity. For example, trade in intermediate goods constitutes about 60 percent of
46See, among others, Corsetti and Pesenti (2005) and Devereux and Engel (2002) for the impli-
cations for monetary and exchange rate policies.
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total UK trade.47
Despite the relevance of trade in intermediate goods, theoretical work on its
implications for invoicing currency and macroeconomic aggregates remains sparse.48
From an empirical point of view, the limitation of the existing literature is due to
the lack of disaggregated data on invoicing currency. For a long time little was
known beyond a number of broad stylised facts, based mainly on aggregated data.
For instance, trade in primary products is mostly denominated in US dollars, while
trade between developing and industrialized countries is predominantly invoiced
in the industrialized countrys currency. It is also acknowledged that inationary
currencies are less likely to be used in foreign trade.49 This paper aims at lling
both theoretical and empirical gaps in the literature.
I derive a theoretical framework in which the exporter is assumed to pre-set
prices and its invoicing currency to maximise expected prots under exchange rate
uncertainty. An important feature of the model is that the exporter chooses its
invoicing currency endogenously. The model predicts that the exporting rms that
are more dependent on imported inputs are less likely to use their own currency,
all else being equal. The intuition behind this result is that pricing in the foreign
currency provides a natural hedge for rms that use foreign currency-denominated
inputs. The model also predicts that a volatile currency is less likely to be used for
invoicing (consistent with the nding of Devereux, Engel and Storgaard, 2004).
In order to test the theoretical predictions, I use a unique and highly disaggre-
gated dataset on UK import and export transactions with non-EU countries in 2011,
recorded by Her Majestys Revenue and Customs (HMRC). For each transaction,
I observe the trader ID, country of dispatch or destination, product and industry
codes, value of transaction and invoicing currency. The econometric analysis con-
sists of two parts. The main part focuses on the choice of invoicing currency for
UK exports (2.54 million transactions). The second part examines the currency
denomination for UK imports (7.31 million transactions).
In the main analysis, I rst identify exportersuse of imported inputs together
with the currencies used for these inputs.50 To the best of my knowledge, this is the
47Source: HMRC trade statistics. Trade in intermediate goods is also related to the following
terms: vertical specialization, outsourcing and fragmentation. See Hummels, Ishii and Yi (2001)
for denitions.
48Ghosh (2009) shows in a model that trade in intermediate goods may be the underlying factor
of the empirical decline of exchange rate pass-through. However, he focuses on rmspricing to
market behaviour and does not consider currency choice.
49See, for example, Grassman (1973), McKinnon (1979) and Tavlas (1991). Also, see Kamps
(2006) for a discussion.
50 I dene imported inputs as goods for industrial use, and the categorization of goods is based
on the Broad Economic Categories (BEC). The BEC classication decomposes goods into three
end-use categories: consumption (nal), intermediate and capital goods. Capital goods are divided
into BEC 41 (capital goods except transport equipment) and BEC 521 (transport equipment for
industrial use). I treat both intermediate and capital goods as industrial inputs.
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rst paper matching trader IDs from both import and export data for a rm-level
analysis of currency of invoicing. I then attempt to explain whether the currency
used for imported inputs a¤ects exporterschoice of invoicing currency. Overall, the
results strongly support the theoretical predictions. First, I nd that exporters using
imported inputs are less likely to use sterling compared to exporters that do not
rely on foreign inputs. Second, among the exporters that use imported inputs, the
more the exporter is dependent on imported inputs priced in the foreign currency,
the more likely the same currency is used for exports. Another key result is that
high exchange rate volatility signicantly shifts UK exportersinvoicing choice away
from the volatile currency.
Other ndings shed some light on relating currency choice to rm characteristics.
For instance, larger UK exporters are less inclined to use their domestic currency.
This supports the argument that larger rms are more likely to hedge using nancial
instruments because hedging incurs a xed cost that large rms are more likely to
a¤ord.51 In contrast, all else being equal experienced rms (trading for more than
ve years in exporting markets) are more inclined to use PCP relative to VCP. This
might suggest higher bargaining power for more experienced rms.52
To complement my main analysis, I also look into the currency denomination
for UK imports. Since I do not observe the use of imported inputs for the exporters
from di¤erent exporting countries, I use a systematic measure of value added to
gross exports (VAX ratios) computed by Johnson and Noguera (2012) to proxy
for the dependence on imported inputs at the country level. If a country heavily
relies on imported inputs, the value added relative to gross exports should be lower.
Hence VAX ratios are inversely related to the dependence on imported inputs. This
is the rst paper to use VAX ratios in examining invoicing currency choice. I nd
that countries more dependent on foreign inputs systematically use less of their own
currency for exports (PCP is less likely).53
In both analyses, I also control for a number of di¤erent factors. These include:
(i) macroeconomic considerations, such as exchange rate volatility (Devereux et al.,
2004) and transaction costs of exchange (Devereux and Shi, 2013); (ii) industry
characteristics, such as market competition (Bacchetta and van Wincoop, 2003)
and price-sensitivity of demand (Bacchetta and van Wincoop, 2005); (iii) strategic
characteristics, such as bargaining between exporters and importers (Goldberg and
Tille, 2008) and (iv) destination characteristics.
51See, for instance, Martin and Méjean (2012) for survey results of 3,013 exporting rms located
in ve EMU countries.
52Goldberg and Tille (2008) consider a bargaining between importers and exporters when deciding
on the invoicing currency. They argue that larger rms have a stronger bargaining power.
53 I also use a further disaggregated VAX ratios at the country-industry level, and the results still
hold. These ratios are computed by Johnson and Noguera based on GTAP database, and are not
published in their paper.
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This paper is related to several strands of literature. There is an extensive the-
oretical literature on the determinants of invoicing currency.54 My main contribu-
tion is to add an alternative but complementary determinant of invoicing currency,
namely rmsuse of imported inputs.
Empirical evidence on currency choice in international trade is scarce. Most
existing studies document country- or industry-specic determinants of invoicing
currency choice, rather than rm-level characteristics.55 One exception is Friberg
and Wilander (2008) with a survey study on the currency considerations of Swedish
exporting rms. They nd that smaller Swedish rms and rms selling di¤erentiated
products are more likely to use Swedish kronor (PCP), a nding that is consistent
with my results. The paper that is the closest to mine is by Goldberg and Tille
(2011) who document the importance of strategic interaction and bargaining power
in determining currency choice using a disaggregated dataset of Canadian import
transactions.56 My paper focuses instead on linking rm-level characteristics such
as rm size, rm experience, and the dependence on imported inputs to the choice
of invoicing currency and o¤ering evidence from UK transaction data.
This paper also relates to the growing literature that examines how invoicing
currency a¤ects rmsprice adjustments and accordingly endogenous exchange rate
pass-through. This literature documents di¤erences in price adjustments for goods
invoiced in di¤erent currencies (see Floden and Wilander, 2006, and Gopinath,
Itskhoki and Rigobon, 2010). Furthermore, some recent studies have looked into
the direct relationship between the use of imported inputs and the degree of pass-
through (see Amiti, Itskhoki and Konings, 2014). Understanding the factors that
drive the choice of invoicing currency sheds some light on the heterogeneity of pass-
through into prices and ination across industries.
Finally, there is an active literature on measuring the domestic content of ex-
ports.57 This paper is an example of the application of the VAX ratios of Johnson
and Noguera (2012). I use the ratios to capture the degree of dependence on im-
ported inputs at the country and country-industry levels.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section sets out a simple model to
show how rmschoice of invoicing currency is a¤ected by the presence of imported
inputs. Section 3.3 presents the dataset and o¤ers descriptive statistics. Section
54See, among others, Baron (1976), Giovannini (1988), Donnenfeld and Zilcha (1991) and Friberg
(1998) for early literature that takes a micro perspective.
55One example is Donnenfeld and Haug (2003) who consider country size and exchange rate
uncertainty as key determinants for invoicing in Canadian imports. Also, Wilander (2005) analyses
currency use for Swedish exports, using country aggregates such as GDP, distance and ination
rates as explanatory variables.
56They use industry-level variables such as market shares of exporters and transaction sizes to
proxy for the bargaining power of exporters and importers.
57See, among others, Hummels et al. (2001).
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3.4 presents the main analysis of invoicing currency choice for UK exporters and
provides robustness checks. The analysis of currency denomination in imports is
undertaken in section 3.5. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 A Model of Imported Inputs and Currency Choice
In this section I develop a framework that relates the choice of invoicing currency to
the dependence on imported inputs. The cost structure of the rm follows Halpern,
Koren and Szeidl (2011) to allow for imported inputs.58 I then build on Devereux
et al. (2004) to derive the rms decision rule for choosing an invoicing currency.59
3.2.1 Demand
Consider a risk-neutral rm i that sells a di¤erentiated good to a foreign country
and faces a CES demand function:
D (pi) =
 
pi
P hf
! 
P hf
P 
 
C; (3.1)
where D is the quantity demanded, pi is the rms price, P hf is the price index for
all home goods sold in the foreign country and P  is the foreign consumer price
index (all denominated in foreign currency). C is the foreign demand shifter that
is independent of prices. The parameter  is the elasticity of substitution across
varieties with  > 1. The parameter  is the foreign elasticity of demand for domestic
goods.
3.2.2 Production and Import Intensity
A risk-neutral rm i uses labour Li and intermediate goods Xi in order to produce
following a Cobb-Douglas production function with constant returns to scale:
Yi = AiX

i L
1 
i ; (3.2)
where Ai is rm is productivity and  2 [0; 1] measures the expenditure share on
intermediate inputs. The cost of labour is the wage rate W .
Intermediate goods consist of two varieties, domestic and foreign, which are
imperfect substitutes:
58Halpern, Koren and Szeidl (2011) do not consider the currency of invoicing but focus on the
relationship between rmschoice of import varieties and productivity.
59Devereux et al. (2004) consider endogenous currency choice without considering imported
inputs.
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Xi =

Z

1+
i + (aiMi)

1+
 1+

; (3.3)
where Zi and Mi are the quantities of domestic and imported inputs, respectively.
The elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign varieties is (1 + ) > 1.60
I assume that the price of the domestic input Zi is Q, denominated in domestic
currency. The foreign input Mi is priced in foreign currency with the price SQ, S
being the exchange rate (dened as the domestic price of foreign currency) and Q
being the price denominated in foreign currency (hence starred).61
The parameter ai captures how productive rm i is in using the foreign inputs,
which in this model varies across rms and directly determines the degree of de-
pendence on imported inputs. A high ai represents high productivity advantage for
rm i in using the foreign inputs, and vice versa.62
Firm i needs to pay a sunk cost fi in terms of labour in order to import foreign
inputs.63 Given output, the rm rst chooses the amount of inputs to minimize its
total costs subject to the production technology. The total cost of the rm is given
by WLi+QZi+ SQMi+Wfi; which can be written as the sum of a variable cost
plus a xed cost:
TCi = iY +Wfi:
The marginal cost i can be derived as:
i =
C
Aib

i
; (3.4)
where C = (Q=) [W= (1  )]1  is a cost index and bi 

1 +

ai
SQ=Q
1=
is
the productivity-enhancing e¤ect from using imported inputs. The productivity-
60Since domestic and foreign inputs are imperfect substitutes, production is possible without the
use of imported inputs. Note that the model also accommodates the cases of perfect substitutes
(when  ! 1) and perfect complements (when  ! 0). In the appendix I discuss rmsuse of
imported inputs and their decision rules under these cases.
61The model can be extended to allow a fraction of the imported inputs to be denominated
in home currency. This extension reduces the degree of input price uncertainty, but it does not
qualitatively change the models predictions. In the empirical section, I will take into account each
rms fraction of imported inputs denominated in home currency.
62When ai > 1, using foreign inputs brings productivity advantage. In contrast, ai < 1 implies
productivity disadvantage. The price-adjusted productivity, ai=(SQ=Q), captures the advantage
of a unit of home currency spent on the foreign variety relative to the home variety. This term
also relates to Grossman and Helpman (1993)s denition of qualityas the advantage in services
provided by a good relative to its cost.
63Fixed costs can explain the fact that some rms use zero foreign inputs. The model can be
extended to incorporate a set of di¤erentiated intermediate goods, so that xed costs play a role
in determining the optimal choice of the cut-o¤ set. This extension, however, does not change the
models predictions on currency choice.
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enhancing e¤ect is increasing in the productivity parameter ai.
With this cost structure, I dene  i as the share of costs spent on imported
inputs in total costs of intermediate goods:
 i 
SQMi
SQMi +QZi
:
The parameter  i directly captures the dependence of the rm on foreign inputs.
Home share of inputs (1   i) can be shown as:
1   i =
"
1 +

ai
SQ=Q
# 1
: (3.5)
Home share of inputs depends on the productivity parameter ai: A rm with higher
productivity gain from using imported inputs (higher ai) has higher dependence on
imported inputs (lower 1  i). The detailed model derivation is shown in Appendix
3.A.
3.2.3 PCP versus LCP
After deciding on the amount of inputs, the rm is then assumed to pre-set optimal
prices and invoicing currency one period ahead by maximising its prots using a
discount factor .64 If the rm sets its price in its own currency (PCP), then the
expected discounted prots are:
EPCPi (pi) = E
24 (pi   i)
 
pi
SP hf
! 
P hf
P 
 
C
35 : (3.6)
If the rm sets its price in the foreign currency (LCP), then the expected discounted
prot is:
ELCPi (p

i ) = E
24 (Spi   i)
 
pi
P hf
! 
P hf
P 
 
C
35 : (3.7)
The prot-maximising prices under PCP and LCP, respectively, are:
pi =

  1 
E
 
i  S


E (S
)
; (3.8)
pi =

  1 
E (i  
)
E (S
)
; (3.9)
64Note that the expectation takes place in period t  1 when the rms sets its price for period t.
The time subscripts are omitted here for simplicity.
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where 
 = P ( )hf P
C:
Following Devereux et al. (2004), I take a second order approximation of the two
expected prot functions and establish the rms decision rule.
Proposition 3 A domestic rm using foreign inputs sets its price for the foreign
market in PCP if:
1
2
var (lnS) >


cov [ln (1   i) ; lnS] : (3.10)
The rm chooses LCP vice versa.
Proof. See Appendix 3.B.
Proposition 3 says that all else being equal exchange rate volatility, captured
by high var (lnS) in (3.10), makes the rm prefer PCP. In contrast, the covariance
between exchange rates and the home share of inputs (1    i) makes the rm
prefer LCP. The former e¤ect captures the rms consideration of expected revenues
whereas the latter captures the consideration of expected costs. Note that in the
model setting, the exchange rates only a¤ect the rms total costs through the use
of imported inputs denominated in the foreign currency. Therefore the right hand
side in (3.10) is shut down for rms that do not use imported inputs. Given any
exchange rate volatility (var (lnS) > 0), they use only the home currency.65 Below
I discuss the two e¤ects in turn.
The e¤ect of exchange rate volatility enters the decision rule through the rms
consideration of expected revenues, as in Devereux et al. (2004). When the rm
chooses PCP, the price is stable whereas the quantity (foreign demand) is subject
to exchange rate uncertainty. On the other hand, when the rm chooses LCP, the
quantity is stable whereas the price is subject to exchange rate uncertainty. The rm
therefore faces a trade-o¤ between stabilising price and stabilising quantity. The
curvature of revenue functions matters for the optimal currency choice. Technically,
the expected revenue function under PCP is convex in the exchange rate and linear
under LCP. Holding all other variables constant, an increase in the exchange rate
variance increases expected revenues under PCP relative to LCP.66
65This model result is supported by empirical evidence from UK data. The majority of UK
exporters that do not use imported inputs price their exports in sterling only. See Section 3.3 for
details.
66The expected revenue functions are E

pi

pi
SP
hf
  Phf
P
 
C

under PCP and
E

Spi

pi
P
hf
  Phf
P
 
C

under LCP.
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The right hand side in (3.10) enters the decision rule through the rms con-
sideration of expected costs. For example, if there is a depreciation in the home
currency (higher S), then foreign inputs become more expensive which leads to a
higher marginal cost. In this case, there will be an expenditure switching of the rm
from using imported inputs to domestic inputs (higher 1  i). The covariance term
is positive and captures how responsive the rm is to input price uncertainty. A
more responsive rm has more incentive to choose LCP for its exports. Intuitively,
choosing LCP provides a natural hedge for the rm. Also, this e¤ect is stronger if
the domestic and foreign inputs are less substitutable (with low elasticity of substi-
tution ).
To see how the degree of dependence on imported inputs a¤ects the decision
rule, I rewrite the right hand side in (3.10) in terms of the productivity-enhancing
e¤ect bi:
R:H:S =


cov [ln (1   i) ; lnS]
=  cov (ln bi; lnS) ;
where the absolute value of cov (ln bi; lnS) is increasing in the degree of dependence
on imported inputs  i:
67 This implies that the right hand side is higher if the rm
is more dependent on imported inputs, all else being equal. Put di¤erently, a rm
more dependent on imported inputs is more likely to use LCP. Based on the above
discussion, the following testable hypotheses follow.
Testable hypothesis 1When exporting to a country with a more volatile exchange
rate, exporters are more likely to use PCP relative to LCP, all else being equal.
Testable hypothesis 2 The more exporters are dependent on imported inputs
priced in the foreign currency, the more likely they are in using the same currency
for their exports.
In this section I show in a two-country framework that the use of imported
inputs denominated in the foreign currency alters a domestic rms choice of invoic-
ing currency. The model yields two testable hypotheses relating to exchange rate
volatility and the dependence on imported inputs. The model can also be extended
to allow for the case of vehicle currency pricing (VCP). In this case, a domestic
rms decision rule also depends on the covariance between the two exchange rates
vis-à-vis the vehicle currency. This extension is shown in Appendix 3.C.
67Note that @ ln bi=@ lnS = ( 1=) i < 0: See Appendix 3.A for proof.
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3.3 The UK Trade Dataset and Descriptive Statistics
3.3.1 The Dataset
I use a highly disaggregated dataset for UK non-EU trade transactions in 2011
recorded by HMRC. The dataset is condential and not publicly available.68 For
each trade transaction, I observe the trader ID, the country of dispatch (for imports)
or the destination country (for exports), product and industry codes, the value of
transaction and the currency of settlement. After dropping observations with no
information on the invoicing currency, I am left with a sample that accounts for
95.1% of total imports (7.31 million observations) and 86.3% of total exports (2.54
million observations).
Arguably, one advantage of UK trade data is the diversity in trading partners.
In 2011, the total number of trading partners is around 190 for both imports and
exports. The main partners are the US, which represents 16% of imports and 29%
of exports, and China which accounts for 15% of imports and 6% of exports.69
3.3.2 A Broad Assessment of Invoicing Currency for UK Trade
I rst report a broad assessment of invoicing currency choice for UK trade. In 2011,
76 currencies were used for UK exports and 103 for imports. Table 3.1 presents
the shares of currency choice, the shares of pricing strategies in PCP/LCP/VCP
and Table 3.2 shows the breakdowns of the shares of pricing strategies by industry,
destination and category of goods.
The rst observation is that there is an asymmetry in the currency use for
exports relative to imports the dominant currency for imports is the US dollar
(64.7%), whereas UK exports are mainly priced in sterling (57.4%). This pattern is
at odds with Swedish evidence reported in Friberg andWilander (2008) that Swedish
exporters mainly use their customerscurrencies for exports. The Euro accounts for
a small share mainly because the data do not include trade with EU countries.
Given that the US only represents 16% of total imports and 29% of exports, it is
clear that the US dollar is used extensively as a vehicle currency, particularly for
imports. As shown in Table 3.1, VCP is the dominant strategy for imports whereas
PCP is the dominant strategy for exports. The sectoral breakdown in Panel A of
Table 3.2 also shows that these patterns hold across sectors, except for beverages
68The full HMRC dataset covers trade transactions between 1996 and 2011. Declaring currency
of invoicing became a requirement in 2010 for non-EU imports and in 2011 for exports (if the
transaction value is greater than £ 100; 000). In 2011, non-EU imports accounted for 49.5% of total
UK imports and non-EU exports accounted for 46.5% of total UK exports.
69These 190 trading partners include countries and some autonomous areas such as Hong Kong.
Other main partners are the East and South East Asia (25% of imports and 21% of exports) and
Europe excluding EU countries (21% of imports and 26% of exports).
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and tobacco (SITC1) in imports.70
The breakdown by destination shown in Panel B of Table 3.2 shows that there is
a signicant variation in pricing strategies across destinations. In particular, almost
all imports from the US are priced in dollar (82.6%). Also, imports from East and
South East Asia have the highest share of goods priced in sterling (42.3%) compared
to other destinations. Turning to exports, half of the exports to the US are priced in
dollar (50.2%) whereas exports to other destinations are mainly priced in sterling.
Next, I decompose goods into nal, intermediate and capital goods according to
the Broad Economic Categories (BEC) classication.71 To the best of my knowledge,
this is the rst paper using the BEC classication to examine invoicing currency for
di¤erent categories of goods. As shown in Panel C of Table 3.2, LCP is used more
extensively for nal goods relative to intermediate and capital goods (in value),
especially for imports. This nding relates to the model assumption in Section 3.2
that imported inputs are priced exogenously in the foreign currency. Panel C shows
that imports in intermediate goods, in particular, are mainly priced in currencies
other than sterling.
The nding that LCP is used more extensively for nal goods is also in line
with the theoretical argument in Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2003) that nal
goods producers are more prone to use LCP due to local competition, compared
to intermediate goods exporters.72 I will test this theoretical prediction formally in
the next section.
Table 3.1: Invoicing Currency Choice for UK non-EU Trade in 2011
 Imports Exports  
Shares of Currency Choice (in Value)  
Sterling (£) 24.5 57.4  
US dollar ($) 64.7 37.1  
Euro (€) 5.3 2.8  
Others                 5.5 2.7  
Sum 100.0 100.0  
    
Shares of Pricing Strategy (in Value)  
Producer Currency Pricing (PCP) 18.8 57.4(£)  
Local Currency Pricing (LCP) 24.5(£) 14.0  
Vehicle Currency Pricing (VCP) 56.7 28.6  
Sum 100.0 100.0  
 
70VCP includes a wide range of currencies (57 for exports and 75 for imports).
71The trade shares of nal, intermediate and capital goods for UK imports in 2011 are 24.2%,
58.2% and 13.9%, respectively. The gures are 18.4%, 56.8% and 15.7% for exports. Some goods
are not classied by the BEC and account for 3.7% of UK imports and 9% of UK exports in 2011.
72 In their model, all exports are intermediate goods sold to domestic nal goods producers.
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Table 3.2: Shares of Pricing Strategy by Industry, Destination and Cat-
egory
  Imports Exports 
Panel A 
1-digit SITC Industry PCP LCP(£) VCP PCP(£) LCP VCP 
0:Food & live animals 10.5 37.7 51.8 68.0 10.4 21.5 
1:Beverages & tobacco 19.0 68.0 12.9 48.4 33.6 18.1 
2:Crude materials 30.5 30.9 38.5 65.5 2.4 32.0 
3:Mineral fuels 2.7 9.7 87.6 65.0 19.3 15.7 
4:Animal & veg. oils 10.6 3.6 85.8 77.9 6.6 15.5 
5:Chemicals 32.0 33.8 34.2 54.7 28.8 16.5 
6:Manufactured goods 10.2 20.5 69.3 54.8 8.6 36.6 
7:Machinery 24.8 29.6 45.6 58.6 14.1 27.4 
8:Miscellaneous 14.8 36.5 48.7 65.5 15.5 19.0 
9:Not classified 37.3 0.7 62.0 50.7 0.5 48.8 
Panel B 
Destination Region/Country PCP LCP(£) VCP PCP(£) LCP VCP 
US 82.6 15.6 1.8 50.2 47.2 2.7 
China 0.3 26.0 73.8 62.4 0.1 37.5 
East/SE Asia 6.4 42.3 51.2 57.3 5.9 36.8 
Europe exc. EU   4.6 21.8 73.6 75.5 2.8 21.6 
Other Americas          10.9 24.9 64.2 53.4 7.8 38.8 
All Others 3.7 21.9 74.4 63.5 1.9 34.6 
Panel C 
The BEC Category PCP LCP(£) VCP PCP(£) LCP VCP 
Final Goods 10.7 41.2 48.1 56.3 27.2 16.5 
Intermediate Goods 18.6 20.1 61.3 56.6 15.8 27.6 
Capital Goods 21.4 25.2 53.4 59.3 13.2 27.5 
Notes: classifications used are the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) and the 
Broad Economic Categories (BEC). 
3.3.3 Importing versus Non-importing Exporters
In the following discussion I turn to descriptive statistics for UK exporters active
in 2011. I categorize UK exporters into two groups: importing exporters if they use
imported inputs and non-importing exporters otherwise. The inputs imported by
all importing exporters account for 63.4% of all UK imported inputs.73 Table 3.3
presents the di¤erences between the two groups according to their rm facts and
pricing strategies. Table 2b presents their export sectors, destinations and categories
of goods.
The rst fact I document is that importing rms are larger than non-importing
exporters in terms of export market share. Among all exporters 32,289 rms (55%)
rely on imported inputs and account for 89.5% of total exports. Another character-
istic of interest relates to rm experience. Within the group of importing exporters,
73The rest is imported by rms that only sell to domestic markets.
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72% (i.e., 23,078 rms) have more than ve years of experience in exporting, and
they account for about 79.9% of total UK exports; in contrast, within non-importing
exporters, only 47% (i.e., 12,520 rms) have more than ve years of experience in
exporting, with about 7.9% of export share.
Table 3.3 also shows that the di¤erence in pricing strategy between importing
and non-importing exporters is signicant. I nd that a large share of non-importing
exporters (75.4%) only use PCP (sterling) for exports, whereas this gure is about
49.9% for importing exporters. Also, a larger share of non-importing exporters (8%)
use only VCP, as opposed to 3.5% for importing exporters. More interestingly, only
14% of non-importing rms use a combination of two or three strategies, as opposed
to 44% for importing rms.74
Do importing exporters use less of PCP because of their importing behaviour
and the consideration of the currency used for their imported inputs, or because
of other rm characteristics such as rm size (market share) and rm experience?
This is the main question that will be explored formally in the next section.
Table 3.4 shows that there is no substantial heterogeneity in export sectors and
export destinations between importing and non-importing exporters. Comparing
the export shares of di¤erent categories of goods, however, we can see that im-
porting exporters have a higher share of exports in intermediate goods compared
to non-importing exporters. This nding suggests that rms that use imported in-
puts also export more intermediate goods, and hence are more engaged in vertical
specialization.
Table 3.3: Importing versus Non-importing Exporters: Firm Facts
 
Importing Non-importing 
Firm Facts   
Share of Total Export 89.5 10.5 
Number of Firms 32,289  26,618  
w/ export value in upper 5
th
 percentile 2,568  377 
exporting for more than five years 
         (share of export) 
23,078 
(79.9%) 
12,520 
(7.9%)  
Shares of Firms by Pricing Strategy (in Number of Firms) 
All PCP (£)              49.9 75.4 
All LCP 2.2 2.5 
All VCP 3.5 8.0 
Mixed of Two or More Strategies 44.4 14.0 
Sum 100.0 100.0 
 
74Within the mixed group, the average shares (by value) of PCP, LCP, and VCP are: 60%, 16%,
and 24% for importing rms and 59%, 15%, 26% for non-importing rms. It is worth noting that
some rms use di¤erent currencies for the same good exported to the same country. This may be
due to multiple importers.
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Table 3.4: Importing versus Non-importing Exporters: Sectors, Desti-
nations and Categories of Goods
 
Importing Non-importing 
Shares of exports by 1-digit SITC Industry (in Value) 
0:Food & live animals 1.2 5.7 
1:Beverages & tobacco 2.8 1.9 
2:Crude materials 2.9 6.2 
3:Mineral fuels 7.4 1.8 
4:Animal & veg. oils 0.1 0.04 
5:Chemicals 17.6 21.5 
6:Manufactured goods 12.2 8.6 
7:Machinery 41.6 40.4 
8:Miscellaneous 12.1 13.1 
9:Not classified 2.1 0.8 
Sum 100.0 100.0 
Shares of Exports by Destination (in Value) 
  US 28.6 31.1
China 6.3 7.2 
East/SE Asia 22.5 27.8 
Europe exc. EU   16.4 14.1 
Other Americas          9.0 5.1 
All Others 17.2 14.7 
Sum 100.0 100.0 
Shares of Exports by the BEC Category (in Value) 
Final Goods 17.6 25.0 
Intermediate Goods 58.6 41.7 
Capital Goods 16.0 13.2 
N/A 7.8 20.2 
Sum 100.0 100.0 
Notes: classifications used are the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) and 
the Broad Economic Categories (BEC). 
3.4 The Determinants of Invoicing Currency Choice for
UK Exporters
I now examine formally how the use of imported inputs a¤ects exporters choice
of invoicing currency for their exports. I use the whole sample of UK exports
(2.54 million transactions) and reduce it into the rm-product-destination-currency
level (0.65 million observations). The dimension that is eliminated is the frequency
of shipping for each exporter (at the product-destination-currency level) within a
year.75
The dependent variables are dummy variables capturing whether the pricing
strategy is PCP, LCP or VCP. The regressions are estimated using a multinomial
logit procedure (MNL) which imposes the constraint that the three invoicing al-
75On average UK rms ship four times a year. The reason for collapsing the data is to avoid
assigning more weights to rms shipping more regularly.
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ternatives are mutually exclusive and exhaustive. Statistical signicance in MNL
specications shows the direction in which the explanatory variables shift the like-
lihood of LCP and VCP away from the PCP (default) option. The estimating
equation is:
i;c;k (PCP ) = MNL

Firmi;Macroc; Industryk

; (3.11)
where superscripts i; c; and k denote rm, destination (country) and industry, re-
spectively. Firmi is a set of factors relating to rm characteristics, including the use
of imported inputs; Macroc is a set of macroeconomic factors relating to exchange
rates; Industryk is a set of other measures at the industry level.
I control for within-industry correlation by clustering the standard errors at the
HS4 level (1,191 clusters). For the sake of clarity, I only report a subset of results
in Table 3.5 together with the associated Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) and
Pseudo R-square statistics.76 When including only constant terms (not reported),
the coe¢ cients are negative and signicant for both LCP and VCP options (relative
to PCP). This shows an unexplained prominence in PCP use for UK exports.
3.4.1 Imported Inputs Variables
Column (1) only includes variables that are related to imported inputs. To dis-
tinguish between importing and non-importing exporters, I use a dummy variable
Importi which takes the value of one if a rm uses imported inputs and zero oth-
erwise. The model in section 3.2 predicts that the use of imported inputs increases
the likelihood of rms to shift away from PCP, and this is supported by the data.
The coe¢ cients on the variable Importi are positive and highly signicant, which
reects the more prominent use of both LCP and VCP (relative to PCP) for im-
porting exporters.
In order to improve on the use of a dummy variable only, I compute a variable
InputPCP i;c which measures the share of inputs that a rm i imports from country
c priced in the currency of country c (PCP from the perspective of country c). This
can be interpreted as rm is e¤ective dependence on inputs from country c.
The results support Hypothesis 2 that rms highly dependent on imported inputs
denominated in the foreign currency are more likely to use LCP relative to PCP.
Given that this variable only captures the bilateral (rm-destination) relation-
ship, I also consider a rm-level ratio InputLCP i which captures the total share of
rm is sterling-denominated imported inputs. For example, suppose a UK exporter
imports inputs from both the US (denominated in dollars) and China (denomi-
nated in sterling), and then produces a nal good that sells to the US. The variable
76Note that the estimates for MNL regressions are odds ratios, not marginal e¤ects.
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Table 3.5: Determinants of Currency Choice for UK Exporters
Notes: The default option is PCP. Industry effects are dummies for SITC 1-digit sectors. Destination effects are dummies for the US, China, 
East/SE Asia, Europe excluding EU, other American countries, and all other countries. Clustered standard errors in parentheses (at the HS4 level 
for column 1-4 and at the firm level for column 5-7). * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Dependent 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
(5) Binary 
logistic  
(6) Linear 
prob. 
(7) Linear 
prob. 
LCP VCP LCP VCP LCP VCP LCP VCP nPCP=1 nPCP=1 nPCP=1 
Firm Characteristics           
Import
i
 0.78*** 0.79*** 0.73*** 0.80*** 0.74*** 0.79** 0.72*** 0.75*** 0.08*** 0.14*** 0.19*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.11) (0.02) (0.02) 
InputPCP
i,c
 0.25*** -1.64*** 0.27*** -1.63*** 0.26*** -1.52*** 0.24*** -1.56*** 0.09*** 0.12*** 0.02* 
 (0.03) (0.08) (0.03) (0.08) (0.03) (0.08) (0.03) (0.08) (0.04) (0.01) (0.03) 
InputLCP
i
 -0.40*** -1.11*** -0.42*** -1.12*** -0.39*** -0.11*** -0.40*** -1.11*** -0.18*** -0.17*** -0.20*** 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.10) (0.02) (0.00) 
ratio
i.k
   0.99*** 0.76*** 1.00*** 0.73*** 1.00*** 0.73*** 0.16*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 
   (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.14) (0.15) (0.13) (0.14) (0.03) (0.06) 
fiveyrold
i
   0.00 -0.17*** 0.12 -0.17*** 0.00 -0.18*** -0.01 -0.02 -0.08*** 
   (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.07) (0.01) (0.02) 
Top10
k
   0.34*** 0.11*** 0.36*** 0.11*** 0.36*** 0.13*** 0.02*** 0.04*** -0.00 
   (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) 
            
Macroeconomic Factors           
cvGBP
c
       6.38*** 1.49*** 6.41*** 1.46*** 0.09** 0.09** 0.39** 
       (0.41) (0.17) (0.49) (0.16) (0.23) (0.04) (0.17) 
cvUSD
c
     -1.70*** -0.68*** -1.67*** -0.64*** -0.34** -0.32** -0.17** 
     (0.41) (0.12) (0.12) (0.06) (0.17) (0.03) (0.07) 
Dpeg
c
       -0.65*** -0.14*** -0.64*** -0.12***   -0.01 
       (0.06) (0.02) (0.06) (0.02)   (0.01) 
Epeg
c
     -1.98*** 0.34*** -1.98*** 0.35***   0.02 
     (0.34) (0.04) (0.34) (0.04)   (0.02) 
FX
c
     0.04*** -0.04*** 0.04*** -0.04***   0.00*** 
     (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)   (0.00) 
            
Industry Characteristics           
ClassC
k
  
vs. Intermediate 
      0.11** 0.01    
      (0.05) (0.06)    
ClassF
k
  
vs. Intermediate 
      -0.09 -0.34***    
      (0.09) (0.08)    
RauchR
k  
 
vs. Homogeneous 
      -0.09 -0.17***    
      (0.08) (0.08)    
RauchN
k   
 
vs. Homogeneous 
      -0.14* -0.27***    
      (0.08) (0.08)    
Final goods 
          -0.09** 
          (0.03) 
Differentiated 
goods 
          -0.04 
          (0.04) 
Constant -1.60*** -3.75*** -1.74*** -3.61*** -5.57*** -0.73** -5.51*** -0.60*** 0.29*** 0.14*** 0.21*** 
 (0.17) (0.24) (0.18) (0.23) (0.21) (0.35) (0.18) (0.24) (0.26) (0.05) (0.03) 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Destination effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Obs. 646,441 646,441 646,441 646,441 646,441 646,441 2,540,331 
AIC 832,915 831,135 821,296 819,164 - - - 
Pseudo-R
2
 0.155 0.157 0.166 0.170 0.03 Adj. R
2
=0.03 Adj. R
2
=0.08 
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InputPCP i;c only captures the dollar-denominated inputs. Adding the variable
InputLCP i would take the other source of inputs into account. It is therefore a
systematic measure of the overall degrees of input price uncertainty facing exporters.
Higher InputLCP i is expected to increase the likelihood of rms to choose PCP.
The results are in line with this prediction, particularly at the expense of VCP.
3.4.2 Other Firm Characteristics
In column (2) I add other factors relating to rm characteristics. Firstly, I consider
rm relative size in terms of market share of exports. I use the variable ratioi;k,
the share of exports of rm i into an HS4 industry, in order to proxy for rm
relative size. I nd evidence of currency choice tilted away from PCP for larger rms
(with high ratioi;k). One possible explanation is that larger rms highly involved in
international activities have more incentives and resources to hedge against exchange
rate uncertainty using nancial instruments. Hence they are more likely to use LCP
or VCP.
Secondly, I also consider rm experience. The dummy variable fiveyroldi takes
the value one if rm i has more than ve years of experience in the exporting market
and zero otherwise. The results suggest that more experienced rms are more likely
to use PCP relative to VCP. One conjecture is that experienced rms may have
more bargaining power since they know the market well and have more information
on potential buyers.
Lastly, I consider transaction size by adding a dummy variable Top10k to capture
whether a transaction falls in the top 10th percentile of transactions in value within
an HS4 industry. Larger transactions are less likely to be priced in PCP in the
results. These result support the theoretical prediction of Goldberg and Tille (2008),
in which larger transactions capture the bargaining power of importers.77 However,
it might be the case that larger transactions are done by larger rms, and therefore
the variable Top10k simply captures a similar e¤ect as the rm size variable ratioi;k:
3.4.3 Macroeconomic Factors
In column (3) I add a set of macroeconomic factors. Two variables are used to
proxy for exchange rate volatility : the coe¢ cients of variation of the importers cur-
rency relative to sterling and the US dollar denoted by, respectively, CV GBP c and
CV USDc. The variables are computed using the IMFs monthly exchange rate data
from 2006-2010.78 Under exchange rate uncertainty, the theory predicts that the
77The results are also consistent with the ndings of Friberg and Wilander (2008) and Goldberg
and Tille (2011).
78 I use the period-average nominal exchange rate, IMFs International Financial Statistics series
rf .
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currency of a country with more volatile macroeconomic conditions is unappealing
for exporters (Devereux et al., 2004). Hypothesis 1 also says that exchange rate
volatility makes PCP more appealing as opposed to LCP. When exporters sell to a
country with a more volatile currency against the US dollar (high CV USDc), they
are more likely to use PCP. Exchange rate volatility against sterling, however, gives
the opposite result. This may be because sterling experienced an unusually high
volatility during the 2006-2009 period.79
I also consider exchange rate pegs. I use two dummy variables to capture ex-
change rate pegs with respect to the dollar and the Euro denoted by Dpegc and
Epegc; respectively. The peg denition follows the IMFs classication in 2007.80
Exchange rate pegs might have mixed e¤ects on exporterscurrency choice. On the
one hand, an exchange rate peg limits exchange rate volatility and so LCP should
be more appealing (Goldberg and Tille, 2011). On the other hand, since the euro
zone is excluded, an exchange rate peg might capture a low or unstable macro-
economic performance in emerging markets. Hence LCP should be less appealing.
The results are consistent with the second argument. I nd that exporters are less
likely to use LCP relative to PCP when exporting to countries with exchange rate
pegs. Surprisingly, dollar pegs (Dpegc = 1) do not increase the probability that UK
exporters settle for a third currency. In contrast, euro pegs (Epegc = 1) increase
the probability that UK exporters settle for VCP relative to PCP.
The last factor I consider is transaction cost of exchange. Following Goldberg
and Tille (2011), FXc captures the share of the importers currency in daily global
foreign exchange market turnover, reported in the BIS Triennial Central Bank Sur-
vey in 2007.81 Higher values of FXc capture lower transaction costs for the im-
porters currency, and hence LCP should be used more (Goldberg and Tille, 2011).82
The results shown in column (4) are in line with this argument.
3.4.4 Industry and Destination Characteristics
In column (4) I add two other factors relating to industry characteristics. The rst
one is market competition. Exporters of consumption goods may face higher local
competition in the foreign market than exporters of intermediate goods. I use the
79 In the section of robustness check, I exclude trade with the US and this e¤ect disappears. The
coe¢ cients on CV GBP c become positive and therefore support Hypothesis 1.
80The various types of pegs are: (a) no separate legal tender; (b) pre announced peg or currency
board arrangement; (c) pre announced horizontal band narrower than or equal to +/-2% and (d)
de facto peg.
81The data include 35 currencies in 2007. Currencies not listed in the survey are assigned zero
shares.
82The theory also predicts that a currency that is traded extensively has lower transaction costs
and is more likely to be considered as a vehicle currency (Devereux and Shi, 2013). Also see
Swoboda (1968) and Rey (2001), among others, for earlier work on the role of currencies as a
medium of exchange.
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BEC classication to dene the end-use of goods. The set of variable Classk is
dened at the 5-digit SITC level and consists of three dummy variables: Final or
consumption (ClassF k), intermediate (ClassIk) and capital goods (ClassCk). Due
to local competition, nal goods sold to consumers are more likely to be priced in
LCP (Bacchetta and van Wincoop, 2003). The nding in column (4) suggests that
nal goods are more likely to be priced in PCP relative to VCP. The coe¢ cient for
LCP is not signicant and therefore there is no evidence supporting the theoretical
predictions for the role of market competition.83
The other factor I consider is substitutability of goods. I use the Rauch (1999)
index to distinguish di¤erentiated from homogeneous goods.84 The Rauch vari-
able is dened at the 4-digit SITC level and is captured by three dummy vari-
ables: Walrasian (RauchW k), reference-priced (RauchRk) and di¤erentiated goods
(RauchNk). Walrasian and referenced-priced goods are viewed as more substi-
tutable than di¤erentiated goods. In theory, LCP is used more for homogeneous
goods because exporters have the incentive to stabilise prices in the currency of
the customers, when demand is highly elastic (Bacchetta and van Wincoop, 2005).
Similarly, Goldberg and Tille (2008) document a coalescing e¤ect: when goods are
more homogeneous, an exporter is more prone to choose the currency used most
extensively by its competitors. The coe¢ cients on the Rauch variables support
the argument that di¤erentiated goods are more often priced in PCP, particularly
relative to VCP.
I also add industry and destination xed e¤ects. In Table 3.5 the industry xed
e¤ects are at the SITC 1-digit level.85 Destination xed e¤ects are for the US,
China, East and South East Asia, Europe excluding EU, other American countries,
and all other countries. These variables are all signicant.
3.4.5 Other Regression Models
In order to provide some interpretations for the magnitude of the coe¢ cients, I use
two other regression models: binary logistic model and linear probability model.
The dependent variable is dichotomous: whether a transaction is priced in non-
sterling (nPCP=1) or sterling (nPCP=0).
Column (5) in Table 3.5 reports the estimated (average) marginal e¤ects from
83 In the previous section, I show that nal goods are more priced in LCP (in value) than inter-
mediate goods. This evidence is not signicant in the regression results. One explanation is that
nal goods transactions are on average larger (in value) than intermediate goods transactions. The
other explanation is that nal goods are shipped more frequently and this dimension is eliminated
in data collapsing.
84The Rauch classication of goods is originally constructed in Rauch (1999) and revised in 2007.
I use the liberal rather than conservative classication.
85Other industry e¤ects considered are the SITC 5-digit level and the HS4 level. The results do
not change qualitatively.
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binary logistic regression. Column (6) reports the results from a linear probability
model. Overall the estimates are consistent with the results from the MNL model.
I interpret only the results relating to the use of imported inputs below.
Firstly, rms that use imported inputs are 8-14% more likely to use a foreign
currency for exports than rms that do not use imported inputs. Secondly, a 1%
increase in a rms e¤ective dependence on foreign inputs priced in the foreign
currency (InputPCP i;c) increases the probability of using a foreign currency by
9-12%. However, it is worth noting here that these two models do not separate
the options of LCP and VCP. As shown in the results of MNL regressions, the
variable InputPCP i;c has opposite e¤ects for LCP and VCP (relative to PCP).
The magnitude of the estimates would be higher if it is for the probability of using
"the same" foreign currency (LCP) for exports. Lastly, a 1% increase in a rms
total share of inputs priced in sterling (InputLCP i) increases the probability of
using sterling by 17-18%.
Column (7) shows the results using a linear probability model with the full
export dataset (2.54 millions). Overall the results predict the same directions as
other specications; however the magnitudes of the coe¢ cients vary. These results
therefore need to be interpreted with caution.
3.4.6 Robustness
I run a number of alternative regressions to ensure the robustness of the results.
A subset of the results are reported in Table 3.6. I consider exclusively exporters
that use imported inputs. Hence the variable Importi is dropped. Column (8) and
(9) show that my ndings remain virtually unchanged. In column (10) I consider
importing rms in the manufacturing sectors only (SITC 6-8). In 2011, UK man-
ufactured goods account for about 56% of total non-EU exports. The estimates
remain robust.
In column (11) I consider a subsample with rms involving in back-and-forth
trade, i.e. importing inputs from and exporting goods to the same country. Again
the results remain robust.
As discussed in the previous section, the US is a special case where LCP is used
extensively compared to other destinations. In column (12) I exclude the US from
the sample and consider UK exports to non-US destinations only. The ndings on
the e¤ects of imported inputs do not change qualitatively. Also, the coe¢ cients
on the variable fiveyroldi are both negative and signicant. This evidence sug-
gests that experienced rms exporting to non-US markets are more likely to use
sterling than any other currency. The results on macroeconomic factors also di¤er
from the previous analysis. In particular, the variable CV GBP c shows the same
predicted e¤ects as the variable CV USDc: High exchange rate volatility against
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Table 3.6: Determinants of Currency Choice: Robustness Checks
Notes: The default option is PCP. Industry effects are dummies for SITC 1-digit sectors. Destination effects are dummies for the 
US, China, East/SE Asia, Europe excluding EU, other American countries, and all other countries. Clustered standard errors in 
parentheses (at the HS4 level). * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
Dependent Variable 
(8) 
 Importing Firms 
 
(9) 
Importing Firms 
 
(10) 
 Importing Firms 
 Manufacturing 
(11) 
 Firms with Back-
and-forth Trade 
(12)  
Importing Firms 
 Excluding US 
LCP VCP LCP VCP LCP VCP LCP VCP LCP VCP 
Firm Characteristics          
InputPCP
i,c
 0.27*** -1.62*** 0.24*** -1.47*** 0.25*** -1.55*** 1.22*** -0.80*** 2.21*** -1.81*** 
 (0.03) (0.08) (0.03) (0.08) (0.03) (0.08) (0.03) (0.08) (0.08) (0.12) 
InputLCP
i
 -0.40*** -1.12*** -0.43*** -1.11*** -0.48*** -1.15*** -0.62*** -1.93*** -0.30*** -1.16*** 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) 
ratio
i.k
 0.97*** 0.74*** 1.13*** 0.71*** 1.03*** 0.67*** 0.68*** 0.53*** 1.66*** 0.68*** 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.19) (0.15) (0.21) (0.19) (0.15) (0.16) (0.18) (0.15) 
fiveyrold
i
 0.01*** -0.15*** 0.01 -0.16*** 0.02 -0.17*** -0.03 -0.30*** -0.15** -0.17*** 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) 
Top10
k
 0.32*** 0.08*** 0.34*** 0.09*** 0.32*** 0.08*** 0.25*** 0.01 0.41*** 0.11*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) 
           
Macroeconomic Factors          
cvGBP
c
   7.35*** 1.20*** 7.60*** 1.22*** 7.96*** 0.95*** -1.14*** -0.27** 
   (0.38) (0.15) (0.41) (0.17) (0.41) (0.20) (0.41) (0.12) 
cvUSD
c
   -1.73*** -0.31*** -2.22*** -0.24** -3.28*** -0.78*** -1.79*** -0.27** 
   (0.34) (0.11) (0.41) (0.12) (0.51) (0.18) (0.41) (0.11) 
Dpeg
c
   -1.18*** -0.04** -1.14*** -0.04** -1.13*** -0.03 -1.14*** -0.07** 
   (0.08) (0.02) (0.08) (0.02) (0.08) (0.03) (0.07) (0.02) 
Epeg
c
   -2.53*** 0.30*** -2.37*** 0.29*** -2.32*** 0.53*** -2.44*** -0.27*** 
   (0.36) (0.05) (0.38) (0.05) (0.49) (0.07) (0.36) (0.04) 
FX
c
   0.04*** -0.02*** 0.04*** -0.02*** 0.03*** -0.02*** 0.04*** -0.04*** 
   (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
           
Industry Characteristics          
ClassC
k
  
vs. Intermediate 
  0.08** 0.03 0.08 0.02 0.08** 0.05 0.04 0.03 
  (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.09) (0.06) 
ClassF
k
  
vs. Intermediate 
  -0.09 -0.55*** -0.17*** -0.56*** -0.27*** -0.55*** 0.27 -0.54*** 
  (0.08) (0.08) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.09) (0.14) (0.08) 
RauchR
k  
 
vs. Homogeneous 
        0.60*** 0.09 
        (0.18) (0.08) 
RauchN
k   
 
vs. Homogeneous 
        0.55*** 0.08 
        (0.12) (0.08) 
Constant -0.95*** -2.86*** -4.27*** -0.65*** -4.83*** -0.39*** -7.04*** 0.46*** -4.79*** -0.79*** 
 (0.19) (0.27) (0.08) (0.05) (0.39) (0.08) (0.40) (0.09) (0.13) (0.08) 
Industry effects Yes Yes 
Yes 
Yes No No 
Destination effects Yes Yes No No 
Obs. 529,890 529,890 452,404 216,845 371,538 
Pseudo-R
2
 0.158 0.163 0.170 0.211 0.141 
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sterling makes PCP more appealing, a result consistent with Hypothesis 1. Fur-
thermore, the coe¢ cients on the exchange rate pegs variables all have signicant
negative signs. This implies that UK exporters are more likely to use sterling when
exporting to countries with exchange rate pegs.86
3.5 Currency Denomination in UK Imports
One challenge of relating imported inputs to currency denomination in imports is to
measure systematically the dependence on imported inputs across exporters from
di¤erent exporting countries. I use a measure of value added to gross exports (VAX
ratio) computed by Johnson and Noguera (2012) to proxy for the dependence on
imported inputs at the country and country-industry level. Countries with higher
value added to gross exports are less dependent on imported inputs. VAX ratios
are therefore inversely related to the dependence on imported inputs.
I take the full sample of UK imports from non-EU countries in 2011 (7.31 mil-
lion transactions). The dependent variables are dummy variables capturing whether
the pricing strategy is PCP, LCP or VCP. The regressions are estimated using a
multinomial logit procedure (MNL), taking PCP as the default option. The esti-
mating equation is:
c;k (PCP ) = MNL

V AXc;Macroc; Industryk

; (3.12)
where V AXc denotes the VAX ratios at the country level,Macroc is a set of macro-
economic factors relating to exchange rates, and Industryk is a set of other measures
at the industry level.
I control for within-industry correlation by clustering the standard errors at the
HS4 level (1,206 clusters). For the sake of clarity, I only report a subset of results
in Table 3.7 together with the associated Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) and
Pseudo R-square statistics. The rst column only includes constant terms. The
positive and signicant coe¢ cients show unexplained prominent use of LCP and
VCP (relative to PCP).
3.5.1 VAX Ratios
VAX ratios capture the share of value-added exports in total exports, ranging from
0 to 1.87 In column (2) in Table 3.7 , the two negative and signicant coe¢ cients
86Another robustness check is replacing the liberal version of the Rauch indexes with the con-
servative one. The results are not reported here but I do not nd signicance in the explanatory
power of the conservative version of the Rauch indexes.
87Countries not included in Johnson and Noguera (2011) are assigned the regional average in the
analysis.
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Table 3.7: Currency Denomination in UK Imports
Dependent Variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
LCP(£) VCP LCP(£) VCP LCP(£) VCP LCP(£) VCP LCP(£) VCP 
VAX
c
   -8.65*** -12.91*** -1.68** -3.30*** -1.67** -3.47*** -1.62** -3.44*** 
   (0.72)  (0.52) (0.73) (0.15) (0.69) (0.64) (0.71) (0.60) 
           
Macroeconomic Factors         
cvGBP
c
       -5.36*** -8.12*** -6.64*** -8.15*** -6.89*** -8.33*** 
       (1.76) (1.33) (0.23) (0.27) (1.63) (1.33) 
Dpeg
c
       0.98*** 1.86*** 1.22*** 1.68*** 0.60*** 1.66*** 
       (0.23) (0.27) (0.23) (0.27) (0.23) (0.27) 
Epeg
c
     1.11*** 0.70** 1.22*** 0.71*** 1.31*** 0.72** 
     (0.35) (0.30) (0.36) (0.29) (0.34) (0.29) 
FX
c
     -0.05*** -0.07*** -0.05*** -0.08*** -0.05*** -0.07*** 
     (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
           
Industry Characteristics         
ClassC
k
     -0.23 -0.37** -0.15 -0.27 -0.17 -0.21 
vs. Intermediate     (0.23) (0.12) (0.17) (0.21) (0.26) (0.18) 
ClassF
k
     0.49*** -0.37 0.55*** -0.28 0.60*** -0.10 
vs. Intermediate     (0.20) (0.15) (0.20) (0.15) (0.19) (0.16) 
Mktshare k,c       1.61** 0.66 1.68*** 0.68 
       (0.39) (0.42) (0.39) (0.42) 
Impct
k
       0.27 -0.13 0.44 -0.10 
       (0.33) (0.28) (0.33) (0.28) 
Top5
k
       -0.22** 0.30*** -0.22*** 0.30*** 
       (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Constant 0.66*** 0.62*** 7.04*** 9.89*** 3.91*** 5.60*** 3.67*** 5.65*** 1.89*** 4.62*** 
 (0.13) (0.09) (0.52) (0.37) (0.70) (0.54) (0.66) (0.55) (0.68) (0.74) 
Industry effects        Yes 
Obs.(millions) 7.31 7.31 7.31 7.31 7.31 
AIC 15,507,253 14,238,974 10,437,866 10,338,805 10,275,217 
Pseudo-R
2
 - 0.082 0.327 0.333 0.340 
Notes: The default option is PCP. Industry effects are dummies for SITC 1-digit sectors. Clustered standard errors in parentheses 
(at the HS4 level). * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
show that high VAX ratios (low dependence on imported inputs) make PCP more
likely. This result holds across columns, after controlling for other factors. This
implies that countries more engaged in trade in intermediate goods use less of their
own currencies for exports. I also use a further disaggregated VAX ratio series at
the country-industry level, and the result still holds.88
3.5.2 Other Findings
With regards to macroeconomic factors, the results again support Hypothesis 1
that exchange rate volatility makes PCP more appealing relative to LCP. Also,
88Results are not reported. VAX ratios at the country-industry level are computed by Johnson
and Noguera, including 93 countries, 19 regions and 57 sectors in GSC codes. These ratios are not
published in their paper.
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UK imports from countries with exchange rate pegs are more likely to be priced
in sterling or a third currency (LCP or VCP). The e¤ects for transaction costs in
foreign exchange market are also signicant.
In column (3) I also consider the BEC classication of goods. Imports of nal
goods are more priced in LCP relative to PCP compared to intermediate goods.
This nding supports the theoretical predictions in Bacchetta and van Wincoop
(2003).
Following Goldberg and Tille (2011), I also control for three other industry char-
acteristics: (i) market share of exporters is captured by the variable Mktsharek;c;
which is the overall market share of all exporters from country c in all UK imports
in industry k (at the HS4 level); (ii) concentration of the importers is captured by
the variable Impctk, which is the share of imports in industry k accounted for by
the top 10 importers and (iii) transaction size is captured by a dummy variable
Top5k, taking the value one if a transaction falls in the top 5th percentile of sized
transaction (in value) within any HS4 industry and zero otherwise.89 The results
are shown in column (4) and (5). Higher market shares of exporters make LCP
more likely relative to PCP. The e¤ects of Impctk are not signicant. Also, the
e¤ects of transaction size di¤er for LCP and VCP.
3.6 Concluding Remarks
This paper documents the stylized facts from UK customs data which show large
discrepancies in rmschoice of invoicing currency. UK rms that rely on imported
inputs are less likely to use their home currency for exports. I view this as the main
contribution of the paper. Although this nding is intuitive, it is important since
it points to rm characteristics as a key determinant for currency denomination
in international trade. Other important ndings are that larger rms (in terms of
market share of exports) are less likely to use PCP, while more experienced rms
are more likely to use PCP.
The application of the VAX ratios computed by Johnson and Noguera (2012)
in the content of invoicing currency is viewed as another empirical contribution. I
show a systematic nding that countries and industries more dependent on imported
inputs (with lower VAX ratios) tend to choose a currency other than their own for
exports.
These nding have strong policy implications for the degrees of exchange rate
pass-through because large variation in invoicing currency choice directly translates
into large variation in pass-through. Currency choice is crucial to understand the
89 In Goldberg and Tille (2011) market share of exporters is a proxy for the bargaining power of
exporters, while concentration of the importers represents the bargaining power of importers.
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e¤ects of exchange rate changes on trade balances well as domestic ination. More-
over, exchange rate pass-through to import prices exhibits signicant heterogeneity
across industries. The manufacturing and raw materials sectors in the UK, for ex-
ample, have much higher pass-through than the energy sector, in both the short and
the long run (Mumtaz, Oomen and Wang, 2006).90 It is therefore important to look
into rm characteristics across industries in order to fully explain the heterogeneity
of pass-through.
One limitation of the paper is not to account for intra-rm trade. Although
some researchers have shown no potential di¤erence in currency choice within and
across rms (Friberg and Wilander, 2008), future analysis and rm evidence would
further contribute to our understanding of the determinants of invoicing currency.
90Their estimated average rates of pass-through are calculated with quarterly UK data from 1984
Q1 to 2004 Q1.
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3.A Model Solutions
This appendix provides the detailed derivation for the model in Section 3.2.2. I
drop the subscript i for brevity. Given output Y , the rm minimizes its total cost:
min
L;X;Z;M
TC(Y ) =WL+QZ + SQM +Wf:
Denote by  and  the Lagrange multiplier on constraints (3.2) and (3.3) respec-
tively. The rst-order conditions of cost minimization are:
W =  (1  ) Y
L
;
 = 
Y
X
;
Q = 

X
Z
1=(1+)
;
SQ = 

aX
M
1=(1+)
:
Rearranging these conditions yields:
W =  (1  ) Y
L
; (A-1)
QX = Y

X
Z
1=(1+)
; (A-2)
SQM
QZ
=

a
SQ=Q

: (A-3)
Substituting (A-3) into (3.3) we get X = Z

1 +

a
SQ=Q
(1+)=
: Together with
(A-2) we get:
QX = Y
"
1 +

a
SQ=Q
#1=
; (A-4)
Substituting (A-4) and (A-1) into (3.2) we can solve for :
 =
C
Ab
; (A-5)
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where b 

1 +

a
SQ=Q
1=
and C =   (1  ) 1QW 1  : Substituting (A-
1), (A-2) and (A-3) into the total cost function yields:
TC(Y ) = Y +Wf; (A-6)
where  is the marginal cost facing the rm.
Finally, the parameter  is dened as the fraction of total costs spent on im-
ported inputs:  = SQM= (SQM +QZ) : Using (A-3) together with the expres-
sion for SQM = Y
 
1  b , I obtain the share of costs spent on imported
inputs as:
 =

1  b 

: (A-7)
Some rearranging yields the home share of inputs in (3.5). It can also be shown that
the partial elasticity of the marginal cost with respect to the exchange rate equals
the import intensity:
@ ln
@ lnS
=
@ ln
@ ln b
 @ ln b
@ lnS
= ( )
h
 

1  b 
i
=  : (A-8)
3.B Proof of Proposition 3
In this appendix I rst provide a proof of Proposition 3. Following the solution
technique of Devereux et al. (2004), I drop the subscript i for simplicity. From (3.6)
and (3.8), the expected discounted prots under PCP are given as:
EPCP =
 

  1
E
 
  S

E (S
)
!1 
E

S


 
 

  1
E
 
  S

E (S
)
! 
E

  S


= e hE S
i hE   S
i1  ; (B-1)
where e = 1 1   1  ; 
 = P ( )hf P C: Note that the last line of (B-1)
follows because prices are preset one period in advance, i.e., Et 1(Pt) = Pt: This
expression may also be rewritten as:
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e fE [exp( lnS) exp (ln
)]g fE [exp(ln) exp( lnS) exp(ln
)]g1  : (B-2)
In the next step I take the second order approximation for the rst term in brackets
in (B-2):
E [exp( lnS) exp (ln
)]  exp [E (lnS))] exp [E (ln
)]


1 +
2
2
var(lnS) +
1
2
var(ln
) + cov(ln
; lnS)

:
(B-3)
Using the same approximation for E [exp(ln) exp( lnS) exp(ln
)], I get an ap-
proximation for EPCP as follows:


1 +
2
2
var(lnS) +
1
2
var(ln
) + cov(ln
; lnS)


"
1 + 12var(ln) +
2
2 var(lnS) +
1
2var(ln
)
+cov(ln; lnS) + cov(ln; ln
) + cov(lnS; ln
)
#1 
(B-4)
where  = e exp [E (lnS)] exp [E (ln
)] exp [(1  )E (ln)] : Taking logs and us-
ing the approximation ln(1 + x)  x, the expected discounted prots thus become:
lnEPCP  ln + 
2
2
var(lnS) +
1
2
var(ln
) +
1  
2
var(ln)
+
"
cov(lnS; ln
) + (1  )cov(ln; lnS)
+(1  )cov(ln; ln
)
#
: (B-5)
Now, from (3.7) and (3.9), the expected discounted prots under LCP are given as:
ELCP = e [E (S
)] [E (  
)]1  : (B-6)
Using the same approximation, this can be shown to be:
lnELCP  ln + 
2
var(lnS) +
1
2
var(ln
) +
1  
2
var(ln)
+ [cov(lnS; ln
) + (1  )cov(ln; ln
)] : (B-7)
Now, comparing (B-5) and (B-7) yields:
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lnEPCP   lnELCP = 1
2
var(lnS)  cov(ln; lnS)
=
1
2
var(lnS) + cov (ln b; lnS)
=
1
2
var(lnS)  

cov (ln (1   ) ; lnS) : (B-8)
The second line comes from the equation for marginal cost in (3.4) and the third line
comes from the home share of inputs in (3.5). The rms decision rule in Proposition
3 follows.
The model also accommodates the cases of perfect substitutes and perfect com-
plements between domestic and foreign inputs. When domestic and foreign inputs
are perfect substitutes ( !1), whether rms use imported inputs or not depends
on the price-adjusted productivity term, ai=(SQ=Q). If a rm has an advantage in
using imported inputs (ai=(SQ=Q) > 1), then the rm uses imported inputs only.
In this case, the right hand side of the decision rule in (3.10) becomes var(lnS)
and the rm uses LCP only. On the contrary, if a rm has no advantage in using
imported inputs (ai=(SQ=Q) < 1), then the rm uses domestic inputs only. In this
case, the right hand side of the decision rule in (3.10) becomes zero and the rm
uses PCP only. If the price-adjusted productivity is unity, the rm is indi¤erent
between varieties of inputs and also indi¤erent between currencies.
When domestic and foreign inputs are perfect complements ( ! 0), rms use
both varieties and are indi¤erent between currencies.
3.C Currency Choice with the Option of VCP
This section extends the model of Devereux et al. (2004) to allow for the case
of vehicle currency pricing (VCP). I consider a three-country environment where
country C is the vehicle currency country. Firm i in country A (Home) sells a
di¤erentiated good to country B (Foreign) and faces a CES demand curve:
T
 
pi

=

pi
P h
 
P h
P 
 
C;
where T is the quantity demanded, pi is the rms price, P h is the price index for all
home goods sold in the foreign country and P  is the foreign consumer price index
(all denominated in the vehicle currency). C is the foreign demand shifter that is
independent of prices. Parameter  is the elasticity of substitution across varieties
and  > 1. Parameter  is the foreign elasticity of demand for domestic goods.
The rm pre-sets prices and invoicing currency one period in advance. The
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expected discounted prots for PCP/LCP/VCP are:
EPCP = E
24pPCP (i)   i
 
pPCP (i)
SACP h
! 
P h
P 
 
C
35 ;
ELCP = E
24SABpLCP (i)   i
 
pLCP (i)
SBCP h
! 
P AB
P 
 
C
35 ;
EV CP = E
24SACpV CP (i)   i
 
pV CP (i)
P h
! 
P AB
P 
 
C
35 ;
where  is the marginal cost denominated in the home currency, SAC is the exchange
rate between currencies A and C (home currency price of the vehicle currency price),
SBC is the exchange rate between currency B and C (foreign currency price of the
vehicle currency price).
The optimal prices which maximise the expected discounted prots, under PCP,
LCP and VCP, respectively, can be derived as follows:
pPCP (i) =

  1 
E
 

SAC

E


SBAC
 ;
pLCP (i) =

  1 
E
 

SBC

E


SACS
 1
BC
 ;
pV CP (i) =

  1 
E (
)
E (
SAC)
;
where 
 = P ( )h P
C:
Using these optimal prices, the expressions for expected discounted prots become:
EPCP = e hE 
SACi hE 
SACi1 
ELCP = e hE 
SACS 1BC i hE 
SBCi1 
EV CP = e [E (
SAC)] [E (
)]1 
where e = 1 1   1  :
Using the second-order approximations for EPCP ; ELCP ; and EV CP and then
taking logs, I obtain:
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lnEPCP  ln + 1
2
var (ln
) +
1  
2
var (ln) +
2
2
var(lnSAC) (C-1)
+
"
cov(ln
; lnSAC) + (1  )cov(ln; ln
)
+(1  )cov(lnSAC ; lni)
#
;
lnELCP  ln + 1
2
var (ln
) +
1  
2
var (ln) (C-2)
+

2
var(lnSAC) +
(1  )
2
var(lnSBC)
+
"
cov(ln
; lnSAC) + (1  )cov(ln; ln
)
+(1  )cov(lnSBC ; ln)  (1  )cov(lnSAC ; lnSBC)
#
;
lnEV CP  ln + 1
2
var (ln
) +
1  
2
var (ln) +

2
var(lnSAC) (C-3)
+ [cov(ln
; lnSAC) + (1  )cov(ln; ln
)] ;
where  = e exp [(1  )E ln] exp [E lnSAC ] exp [E ln
] :
By comparing (C-1) and (C-3), we can get EV CP > EPCP if and only if:
cov (lnSAC ; ln)  1
2
var (lnSAC) > 0: (C-4)
By comparing (C-2) and (C-3), we can get EV CP > ELCP if and only if:
1
2
var (lnSBC) + cov (lnSBC ; ln)  cov (lnSAC ; lnSBC) > 0: (C-5)
Firms Decision Rule
Combining (C-4) and (C-5) we get the rms decision rule. The rm in country A
sets its price in the vehicle currency if and only if:
1
2
var (lnSBC) + cov (sBC ; lni)  cov (lnSAC ; lnSBC) > 0 and
cov (lnSAC ; lni) 
1
2
var (lnSAC) > 0: (C-6)
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In this condition, the covariance between two exchange rates vis-à-vis the vehicle
currency is a new element compared to a two-country setting. If the covariance
between two existing exchange rates vis-à-vis the vehicle currency is negative, rms
are more inclined to choose VCP. The condition also says that a more volatile
exchange rate between countries B and C would lead the rm in country A to set
its price in the vehicle currency rather than currency B. A more volatile exchange
rate between countries A and C, on the other hand, would discourage the rm to
set its price in the vehicle currency.
Chapter 4
Gravity with Trade in
Intermediate Goods
4.1 Introduction
The gravity model has experienced great success in explaining the e¤ects of the
distance-related factors on bilateral trade ows. These include national borders,
tari¤ and non-tari¤ barriers, trade costs, as well as non-economic factors such as
cultural and language di¤erences. A micro-founded framework pioneered by Ander-
son and van Wincoop (2003, henceforth A-vW) is now widely used as the standard
gravity formulation and tested empirically. Due to the broad nature of the grav-
ity equation, a good amount of subsequent research has attempted to estimate the
proxies for the variables in the equation, in particular trade costs, to explain gross
trade ows. A scholarly consensus is that gravity-type equations are empirically
evident.91
Much less attention, however, has been given to an empirical regularity, namely
trade in intermediate goods or back-and-forth trade, in the gravity literature. Intu-
itively, if any country is involved in back-and-forth trade with another, gross trade
ows overstate the actual demand and supply in both countries. When countries
are involved in vertical specialisation where production process goes through more
than two countries, there exists a hidden structure of trade underlying the gross
trade ows.92 This paper asks how underlying trade structure alters the predictions
and performances of the gravity models.
Gravity equations for gross trade can be derived from a number of trade mod-
els such as Krugman (1979), Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Melitz (2003). Some
91See Brakman and van Bergejik (2010), for example, for the history of the gravity model.
92See Hummels, Ishii and Yi (2001) for the denition. Also, Feenstra (1998) for a survey of the
1990s literature on the disintegration of production.
75
Chapter 4. Gravity with Trade in Intermediate Goods 76
scholars have also considered the cross-border intermediate input linkages.93 The
main focus of the paper, however, is more closely related to studies which argue
that the economic mass variables such as country GDPs fail to be good proxies
when trade in intermediate goods is important. Bergstrand and Egger (2010) and
Baldwin and Taglioni (2011), for example, show similar results that the standard
gravity variables perform well on a huge database consisting of a wide range of
countries.94 As Baldwin and Taglioni (2011) point out, this is because the pattern
of trade in intermediate goods is proportional to trade in nal goods, especially
for trade among the developed countries. When testing the standard gravity equa-
tion on a subsample of the factory Asian countries, however, Baldwin and Taglioni
(2011) report a relatively poor performance.95 The conjecture is that these Asian
countries are more involved in trade in intermediate goods. To explore it more sys-
tematically, they propose a modied gravity equation that includes an additional
independent variable: the share of bilateral imports that is in intermediates, and
test it on bilateral trade between pairs of 187 countries. Their results show that
the economic mass variables (i.e. GDP) in gravity equation fail to be good proxies
when trade in intermediate goods are more dominant.
This paper analyses gravity equations incorporating trade in intermediate goods
and identify the gravity predictions that are similar to or di¤erent from models with
nal goods only. I start with an accounting exercise showing that even without trade
in intermediate goods, gravity models over-predict trade volume in the presence of
(domestically produced) intermediate goods. More interestingly, trade in intermedi-
ate goods actually helps mitigate such e¤ect. Another important implication is that
the standard gravity model predicts a lower amount of trade for smaller importing
countries.
In the main analysis I build a theoretical framework with di¤erentiated inter-
mediate and nal goods and discuss the model predictions in the form of gravity
equations. The model is based on Krugman (1979) with complete specialisation and
monopolistic competition.96 The model di¤ers from Baldwin and Taglioni (2011)
in allowing for di¤erent elasticities of substitution between nal and intermediate
goods-sectors.97 This distinction is crucial for examining sectoral di¤erences in the
93Noguera (2012), for example, derives an approximation of the gravity equation for value-added
trade based on Anderson and van Wincoop (2003).
94Both studies adopt the classication of UN Broad Economic Categories (BEC).
95The Factory Asia countries include Japan, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand
and Taiwan.
96Complete specialisation and monopolistic competition are not the only structures compatible
with a gravity model. See, for instance, Baier and Bergstrand (2001) for a list of exceptions and
Haveman and Hummels (2004) for the implications of incomplete specialisation for gravity equation.
97Ethier (1982) extended Krugman (1979) to incorporate di¤erentiated intermediate goods, but
nal goods are homogeneous. In his framework all trade is in intermediates. Krugman and Ven-
ables (1995) allow for both di¤erentiated intermediate and nal goods. However, the focus is on
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predictions of gravity models.
The rst nding of the model is that there are gains from trade for both trade
in intermediate goods and nal goods. The degree depends on the elasticities of
substitution and the production function parameters. I then derive gravity equations
for trade in both types of goods separately. I also derive the bilateral value-added
ratio (VAX ratio), proposed by Johnson and Noguera (2012).
The main contribution of the paper is to relate gravity equations to labour shares
of income. The model results show that labour shares of income enter the two gravity
equations with di¤erent signs. Moreover, the weighted average on labour share of
income in the importing country and the exporting country also enter the equations
with di¤erent signs. Similar results are found for the bilateral VAX ratio. This is
because in the model, high labour share of income in the exporting country implies
large intermediate goods sector (which uses labour only). The same parameter for
the importing country, however, captures higher income spent on nal goods. Given
that the parameter is industry-specic, the implication of these results is that it is
crucial to take it into account when analysing the e¤ects of industry-specic factors
on bilateral trade ows.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section sets out a simple accounting
exercise to show trade predictions in a frictionless world with trade in intermediate
goods. Section 4.3 presents the main analysis of the gravity predictions when there
is trade in intermediate goods. Section 4.4 concludes.
4.2 Gravity and Trade in Intermediate Goods
4.2.1 Frictionless Gravity Model
I begin by providing a simple model closely related to the standard A-vW gravity
equation based upon the properties of expenditure systems. Here I assume away
trade barriers and note that production is completely specialised.98 In what follows,
C denotes consumption, Y is gross output as well as income (real GDP), and T is
volume of trade. Assuming balanced trade and identical and homothetic preferences,
the bilateral volume of trade from country i to j (Tij) is:
Tij = jYi; (4.1)
where j = Yj=Yw denotes the fraction of js income spent on country is product.
Rearranging (4.1) gives a prediction for bilateral trade:
geographical allocation of rms and wage di¤erences across industries, instead of bilateral volume
of trade concerning gravity studies.
98For simplicity, the varieties of goods are dened symmetrically. A variety index is therefore
dropped.
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Tij =
YiYj
Yw
= Tji: (4.2)
This equation is the well-known frictionless gravity model. Summing (4.2) over all
is trade partners, we get is total exports, or the multilateral volume of trade:
Ti =
X
j 6=i
Tij =
X
j 6=i
YiYj
Yw
= Yi (1  i) : (4.3)
This equation implies the trade share of income (T=Y ) is decreasing in a countrys
share of world income ().
4.2.2 Trade in Intermediate Goods
In this section I present a simple accounting exercise to derive the predictions for
the volume of trade in the presence of intermediate goods. As above, trade is cost-
less and production is completely specialised. Without introducing preferences and
technology, I assume the consumption share (in nal goods) is simply its production
share in world output. With the use of intermediate goods, it is important to distin-
guish gross output from income. In what follows, Y denotes gross output (in value)
and I denotes income (GDP). Also, superscripts M denote intermediate goods and
C nal goods. Assume countries di¤er in relative sizes of the two production sectors.
In country i, a production share i is in nal goods:
Y Ci = iYi; (4.4)
and the rest 1  i is in intermediate goods:
YMi = (1  i)Yi: (4.5)
Assuming identical and homothetic preferences, country j demands a fraction
Cij of is production in nal goods:
TCij = 
C
ijYi; (4.6)
where Cij  i (Yj=Yw) is the product of is production share in nal goods and js
share in world total production. Similarly, country j demands a fraction Mij of is
production in intermediate goods:
TMij = 
M
ij Yi; (4.7)
where Mij depends on the production function and demand structure which will be
introduced in the next section.
Chapter 4. Gravity with Trade in Intermediate Goods 79
Market clearing conditions yield:
iYi =
X
j
CijYi;
(1  i)Yi =
X
j
Mij Yi; (4.8)
which imply all country is output must be either consumed domestically or bought
by foreign importers.99
Rewriting Cij as a function of j (js world output share) gives:
Cij  i

Yj
Yw

= ij : (4.9)
Using (4.6)-(4.9), we can solve the bilateral volume of trade:
Tij = T
C
ij + T
M
ij
=
YiYj
Yw
"
i +
Mij
j
#
: (4.10)
Equation (4.10) shows the gravity prediction with the presence of intermediate
goods. When all goods are nals, i = 1 and Mij = 0. Equation (4.10) reduces to
the simple frictionless gravity model, equation (4.2).100 Therefore, the rst term
in equation (4.10), YiYj=Yw; captures the maximum level of trade in a frictionless
world with nal goods only.
The term in brackets shows two opposite forces a¤ecting the performance of
the gravity model. The rst term in the brackets is the consumption trade e¤ect.
If any production is used as intermediate goods (regardless of the destination),
i < 1; we expect lower trade volume as opposed to the standard frictionless case.
This speaks to the argument that standard gravity models tend to over-predict
trade volumes.101 Put di¤erently, even if countries trade nal goods only (i.e. the
second term in the brackets can be dropped), this e¤ect still exists with the use of
domestically produced intermediate goods in production.102
99From (4.4) and (4.6), Y Ci =
P
j
TCij =
P
j
CijYi =
 
Y Ci =i
P
j
Cij : This gives i =
P
j
Cij : From
(4.5) and (4.7), YMi =
P
j
TMij = Yi
P
j
Mij = (1  i)Yi: This gives 1  i =
P
j
Mij :
100 In a frictionless world, gross output equates gross value added if there is no trade in intermediate
inputs, and also equates country GDP (because of no tax or subsidies).
101 In particular, studies in favour of incomplete specialisation nd similar results. See, for example,
Haveman and Hummels (2004).
102Other interpretations of this e¤ect might include non-tradable goods and the degree of incom-
plete specialisation.
Chapter 4. Gravity with Trade in Intermediate Goods 80
The second term in the brackets shows that trade in intermediate goods actually
mitigates the rst e¤ect and helps improve the bilateral trade prediction of gravity
models (Mij > 0). The general conjecture that trade in intermediate goods implies a
higher trade volume does not necessarily hold. This depends on whether the second
e¤ect outweighs the rst one. Another interpretation is that even if both production
and trade in intermediate goods are proportional to total output (Mij and i xed),
the standard gravity model predicts a lower amount of trade for smaller importing
countries (i.e. neglecting a small j in the model underestimates the trade volume).
Equation (4.10) also provides some insight on the income elasticity of trade. It
is well-known that income elasticity in the standard gravity model is unity. This is
only true in equation (4.10) if the term in brackets is uncorrelated with incomes.
4.3 The Theoretical Framework
The market structure of this model is based upon Krugman (1979) with complete
specialisation and increasing returns to scale in both intermediate and nal goods
sectors. The gravity equation is closely related to Anderson and van Wincoop
(2003).
4.3.1 Consumers and Import Demand for Final Goods
The representative consumer in each country maximises a constant-elasticity-of-
substitution (CES) utility function subject to a budget constraint where prices of
the imported products reect iceberg trade costs. Demand in nal goods follows a
CES structure with the elasticity of substitution , with  > 1. Utility maximisation
yields country js import demand for is nal goods:
TCij =

pij
Pj
1 
ECj ; (4.11)
where ECj is js total expenditure on consumption goods, Pj =
P
i
p1 ij
1=(1 )
is the standard Dixit-Stiglitz price index, and pij = tijpi is the price facing js
consumers inclusive of the trade cost tij , with tij > 1. This equation also represents
the domestic demand function when i = j, for which tij = 1.
4.3.2 Production and Import Demand for Intermediate Goods
I assume all rms produce both intermediate and nal goods. They cannot enter
or exit only one market. Therefore, the number of rms in any country is also the
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number of varieties it o¤ers for both goods.103 Labour is assumed mobile across
sectors, but immobile across countries.
Production in intermediate goods uses labour only with a linear cost function:
lMi = f + vy
M
i ; (4.12)
where lMi denotes labour input used in intermediate sector, y
M
i = Y
M
i = ni is the
representative rms market share in intermediate goods. f is the xed cost and v
the variable (marginal) cost. The total cost function is given by:
Ci(y
M
i ) = wi
 
f + vyMi

; (4.13)
where wi is the wage.
Final goods in each country are produced by combining local labour inputs with a
bundle of intermediate goods from all countries. Dene zi as the input combination:
zi 
 
lCi
1 
xi ; (4.14)
where lCi denotes domestic labour input, and xi =
 P
j
xji
( 1)=
!=( 1)
is the
bundle of intermediate inputs from all countries j:  is the elasticity of substitution,
with  > 1. Parameter  is the input share associated with the corresponding
intermediate bundle, with 0 <  < 1. Also, zi follows a linear cost function:
zi = F + V y
C
i ; (4.15)
where F is the xed cost and V the variable (marginal) cost, and yCi = Y
C
i = ni is
the rms market share in nal goods.
Firmsimport demand for intermediate goods also follows a CES demand. Coun-
try js import demand for is intermediate inputs is:
TMij =

qij
Qj
1 
EMj ; (4.16)
where EMj is js total expenditure on intermediate inputs, Qj =
P
i
q1 ij
1=(1 )
is
the input price index of the intermediate bundle, and qij = tijqi is the price facing
js rms inclusive of the trade cost. Also, I assume identical trade costs for both
goods, and symmetric trade costs between country pairs: tij = tji:
103This setting implies when the number of rms increases, production chain also gets more
fragmented because rms use more (di¤erentiated) intermediate inputs for producing nal goods.
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4.3.3 Equilibrium and Gains from Trade
a) Pricing and Output
For intermediate goods sector, two conditions characterise equilibrium in the model.
Firstly, prot maximisation ensures that prices are a markup over marginal costs in
this class of model:
qi =


   1

vwi: (4.17)
Secondly, under monopolistic competition rms earn zero prot which implies:
yMi =
f
v
(   1) : (4.18)
Therefore, the rms market share of intermediate output is determined parametri-
cally by the cost and factor demand functions.
Similarly, for nal goods sector prot maximisation ensures the prices are a
markup over marginal costs:
pi =


   1

V 'w1 i Q

i ; (4.19)
where '    (1  ) 1, and rms take the input price index Qi as given. Under
monopolistic competition rms earn zero prot, and the condition yields:
yCi =
F
V
(   1) : (4.20)
Similarly, the rms market share of nal output is determined parametrically by
the cost and demand functions.
b) Labour Market Equilibrium, Relative Sector Sizes and Equilibrium
Number of Firms
I rst dene output, expenditure and labour shares for both sectors in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Output, Expenditure and Labour Shares
Intermediate Goods Sector Final Goods Sector
Output YMi =Yi  1  i Y Ci =Yi  i
Expenditure EMi =Yi  1   i ECi =Yi   i
Labour LMi =Li  1  i LCi =Li  i
Country i has xed labour endowment Li = LMi + L
C
i and in equilibrium there
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is full employment. Solving for relative sector size in outputs gives:
YMi
Y Ci
=
1  i
i
=
f=v
F=V
   1
   1 ; or
i =

1 +
f=v
F=V
   1
   1
 1
: (4.21)
Relative sector size in intermediate relative to nal outputs depends on the costs
and elasticities.
Solving for relative share of expenditures and rewriting it in terms of  gives:
EMi
ECi
=
1   i
 i
=
i
1  i ; or
 i = 1  i: (4.22)
Relative share of expenditures depends on the input share on intermediate goods in
production () and the share of nal goods in outputs (). Note that the expen-
diture on intermediate goods is proportional to output in nals. Therefore when
the share of nal goods in outputs increases (higher ), there is higher expenditure
on intermediate goods (lower ).104 Another interpretation of  is the "weighted"
average of labour share of income. Labour share of income is unity in intermediate
goods sector and 1   in nal goods sector.  is the weighted average labour share
of income, with each sector weighted by its output share.105
Solving for relative sector size in labour and rewriting it in terms of  gives:
LMi
LCi
=
1  i
i
=
1
1  
1  i
i
; or
i =

1 +
1
1  
1  i
i
 1
: (4.23)
Relative sector size in labour also depends on  and : Higher input share on
intermediate goods in production () leads to larger relative sector size in labour.
However, when the share of nal goods in outputs () increases, the allocation of
labour is shifted towards the nal goods sector.
Wages relative to input price index can also be solved, using cost functions and
relative sector sizes:
104That is, EMi = Y
C
i : Expenditure on consumption equals country GDP (E
C
i = wiLi). Empiri-
cally,  rarely varies for country aggregate data. Take Canada for example, the GDP/gross output
ratio has been around 0.53-0.54 since 2001. However,  exhibits signicant sectoral heterogeneity.
105
 
YMi =Yi
 1 +  Y Ci =Yi (1  ) =  :
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wi
Qi
=  1 (1  )1 1=

1  i
i
F
f
1=
: (4.24)
The equilibrium number of rms can be shown as:
ni =
Li
f

1  i
1  i

: (4.25)
The equilibrium number of rms is larger with higher labour endowment, higher
input share on intermediate goods in production and lower share of nal goods in
outputs.
c) Equilibrium Wages
To see how wages are solved, take labour income in nal goods sector which equals
labours share (1  ) in nal goods production.
wiL
C
i = (1  )Y Ci
= (1  )
X
j
CijE
C
j ; (4.26)
where Cij =

tijpi
Pj
1 
is the income share of j spent on is nal goods, corresponding
to the CES demand structure. The second equation is the market clearing condition
with the sum of country is total exports in nal goods around the world, including
its sales at home.
Labour income in intermediate goods sector is country is total gross output in
intermediate goods (as labour is the only production factor), which is also country
is total exports in intermediate goods around the world, including its sales at home:
wiL
M
i = Y
M
i
=
X
j
Mij E
M
j ; (4.27)
where Mij =

tijqi
Qj
1 
is the income share of j spent on is intermediate goods,
corresponding to the CES demand structure.
Combining labour market equilibrium conditions (4.26) and (4.27), together with
(4.21)-(4.23) yields:
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wiLi =
X
j

Mij E
M
j + (1  )CijECj

=
X
j
wjLj

i
1  i 
M
ij + (1  )Cij

: (4.28)
When there is no intermediate goods,  = 0; equation (4.28) reduces to wiLi =P
j
ijwiLi: In this case, country is gross output (also GDP, which equals to wiLi)
is a weighted sum of all countries gross outputs (including itself), weighted by
the income share spent on is exports.106 In equation (4.28), the term in brack-
ets captures the adjusted weights assigned to every country with the presence of
intermediate goods.
In order to solve wages we need to solve equilibrium prices, trade shares, together
with (4.28) simultaneously. In the next subsection I illustrate the model with two
special cases, in autarky and a frictionless world.
d) Wages in Special Cases: Autarky and Frictionless World
In Autarky, i =  i and Mii = 
C
ii = 1 for country i. Also, qi = Qi and pi = Pi:
107
Using the equilibrium price equations it is easy to show the real wage in autarky,
denoted as wAi :
wAi 
wi
Pi
=  (1  )1 

   1
V

   1
v

: (4.29)
Real wage in autarky depends on the share of intermediate goods in production ,
variable costs and the elasticities of substitution. The higher , the more sensitive
real wage is to changes in the intermediate sectors.
In a frictionless world, tij = tji = 1: Rewrite the labour market equilibrium
conditions (4.26) and (4.27) for two countries i and j, and also note that price
indexes are identical across countries:
wi
wj
=
LMi
LMj
=
LCi
LCj
: (4.30)
In a frictionless world, the relative real wages (which equal to relative nominal
106 In a symmetric world where wiLi = wjLj for all pairs,
P
j
ij = 1.
107From (4.21)-(4.23) we can calculate that i
1 i = .
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wages) are the relative size of both sectors (in labour) between country i and j.
e) Gains from Trade
In this section I show the welfare implications of the model. To start with, take
income share country i spent on its own goods:
Mii =

qi
Qi
1 
Cii =

pi
Pi
1 
: (4.31)
Using these equations and the equilibrium prices, we get an expression of real wage
(wi=Pi) as a function of is shares of purchases from home:
wi
Pi
=

1
Mii
 
 1

1
Cii
 1
 1
wAi ; (4.32)
where wAi is the real wage in autarky. In autarky, 
M
ii = 
C
ii = 1; equation (4.32)
reduces to wAi . It is clear that when country i trades more in either intermediate or
nal goods, there are gains from trade. Also, given import shares, trade gains are
greater the higher  and the lower elasticities of substitution.
4.3.4 Gravity Equations and Value-Added (VAX) Ratios
In this section I present the gravity equations derived from the model, and discuss
its link to the value-added ratio presented in Johnson and Noguera (2012).
The gravity equations are derived following a six-step derivation, based on Bald-
win and Taglioni (2006) in demonstrating the A-vW gravity equation.108 First, I
present gravity predictions for bilateral intermediate goods trade in terms of gross
outputs (Y ) and country GDP (I):
TMij =

 i +    1


(1   j) YiYj
Y W

tij
Mi Qj
1 
=

 i +    1
 i

1   j
 j

IiIj
Y W

tij
Mi Qj
1 
; (4.33)
where Mi 
 P
j

tij
Qj
1 
EMj
YW
!1=(1 )
:109 The standard prediction that richer
108The derivation is presented in Appendix 4.A in detail.
109Note that labour share of income is exogenous depending on . Here we assume  is constant
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countries trade mode still hold. Bilateral trade in intermediate goods is increas-
ing in  i but decreasing in  j :
Similarly, bilateral nal goods trade in terms of gross outputs and country GDPs
are:
TCij =

1   i


 j
YiYj
Y W

tij
Ci Pj
1 
=

1   i
 i

IiIj
Y W

tij
Ci Pj
1 
; (4.34)
where Ci 
 P
j

tij
Pj
1 
ECj
YW
!1=(1 )
: The second line of the equation shows trade
in nal goods is decreasing in  i: The equation also shows that GDP of the importer
country remains a good proxy for predicting trade in nal goods.
The VAX ratio for a country captures the domestic content of exports. It is
dened by Johnson and Noguera (2012) as the ratio between value-added exports
to gross exports. Here I focus on the bilateral VAX ratio:
V AXij  vaij
Tij
;
where vaij is the value-added generated by country i that is absorbed in country j,
and Tij is the gross trade volume. VAX ratio is the proportion of actual domestic
content of exports, with V AXij < 1: In the model, value-added ratios in each sectors
equal to labour shares of income: one for intermediate sector and (1  ) for nal
goods sector. The VAX ratio can be derived:
V AXij =
TMij + (1  )TCij
TMij + T
C
ij
= 1  
 
TMij
TCij
+ 1
! 1
: (4.35)
The model predicts that the VAX ratio is increasing with the relative trade ow
TMij =T
C
ij and decreasing in . The reason is intermediate goods sector generates
higher value added by denition. Also, TMij =T
C
ij can be shown using (4.33)-(4.34):
TMij
TCij
=


1   i   1

1
 j
  1

(tij)
   Ci Pj1   Mi Qj1  : (4.36)
and discuss the e¤ects of the labour share of income only.
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In a frictionless world, tij = 1 and
 
Ci Pj
1   
Mi Qj
1 
= 1; and TMij =T
C
ij reduces
to the term in brackets. The bilateral VAX ratio, denoted as V AXFij ; becomes:
V AXFij = 1  


1   i   1

1
 j
  1

+ 1
 1
: (4.37)
Again we see the opposite e¤ects  i and  j have on the ratio.
The key result of the analysis is that the weighted averages of labour share of
income in the exporting country and the importing country have di¤erent impacts
on bilateral trade ows as well as the bilateral value-added to gross trade ratios.
Intuitively, for the exporter, an increase in the weighted average of labour share
of income leads to a larger intermediate sector, which contributes to more exports
of intermediate goods. For the importer, on the other hand, a higher weighted
average of labour share of income implies a lower expenditure on intermediate inputs,
resulting in less imports of intermediate goods.
4.4 Concluding Remarks
This paper asks whether trade in intermediate goods matters to the performance
of the standard gravity models. When countries are involved in any production
sharing in which production process goes through more than two countries, there is
a further hidden trade structure underlying the gross trade ows.
It is common knowledge that the gravity models often overestimate bilateral
trade ows. I rst show in a simple accounting framework that it is the use of
(domestic or imported) intermediate goods rather than trade in intermediate goods
that results in the missing trade. Put di¤erently, with the presence of intermediate
goods a gravity model based on country outputs would overestimate gross trade ows
and trade in intermediate goods actually helps shorten the gap between actual and
predicted trade volume.
I then introduce the use of intermediate goods in production into a general
equilibrium model with complete specialisation and monopolistic competition in
both intermediate and nal goods sectors. The rst model result shows gains from
trade for trade in both types of goods. Next I derive the corresponding gravity
equations for both trade in intermediate and nal goods. The main contribution of
the paper is to identify what drives the di¤erences between trade in intermediate
goods and nal goods from a theoretical point of view. The model results suggest
that labour shares of income from the importing and exporting countries enter the
gravity equations with the opposite signs. The results speak up to the argument
that using economic mass variables such as GDPs in gravity equations may not
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well capture the underlying trade structure and leads to a bias in the estimates.110
Also this result is particularly relevant when exploring cross-sectoral comparisons
in trade elasticities.
How can the results be tested empirically? One potential starting point would
be estimating a baseline gravity model with country GDPs as proxies and then
examining whether adding labour shares of income improves the performance of the
model.
110Therefore the paper does not relate to gravity models using xed e¤ects instead of economic
mass variables as proxies.
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4.A The Derivation of Gravity Equations
The bilateral trade ows of intermediate goods can be derived in six steps.
Step 1: Supply equals demand. The value of trade ow in intermediate goods from
i to j should equal to the share country i has in expenditure of j.
qijT
M
ij = 
M
ij E
M
j
= Mij (1   j)Yj ; (A-1)
where the second equation comes from the denition in Table 4.1.
Step 2: Mij follows a CES demand structure.
Mij =

qij
Qj
1 
: (A-2)
Step 3: Adding trade costs.
qij = tijqi: (A-3)
Step 4: Aggregating across varieties, we can get the total intermediate trade ow
from i to j.
TMij = ni
M
ij E
M
j
= ni

tijqi
Qj
1 
(1   j)Yj : (A-4)
Step 5: Market clearing condition holds.
YMi =
X
j
TMij
= niq
1 
i
X
j

tij
Qj
1 
(1   j)Yj ; (A-5)
where the second equation follows from (A-4). We can rewrite (A-5) as:
niq
1 
i =
YMi =Y
W 
Mi
1 
=

 i +    1


Yi=Y
W 
Mi
1  ; (A-6)
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where Mi 
 P
j

tij
Qj
1 
EMj
YW
!1=(1 )
:
Step 6: A gravity equation for intermediate trade ow can now be derived by
combining (A-4) and (A-6):
TMij =

 i +    1


(1   j) YiYj
Y W

tij
Mi Qj
1 
: (A-7)
Using (4.21) and (4.22) in the main text we can also rewrite the gravity equation
in terms of country GDPs:
TMij =

 i +    1
 i

1   j
 j

IiIj
Y W

tij
Mi Qj
1 
: (A-8)
Similarly, the bilateral trade ows of nal goods can be derived in the same way.
Step 1: Supply equals demand. The value of trade ow in nal goods from i to j
should equal to the share country i has in expenditure of j.
pijT
C
ij = 
C
ijE
C
j
= Cij jYj : (A-9)
Step 2: Cij follows a CES demand structure.
Cij =

pij
Pj
1 
: (A-10)
Step 3: Adding trade costs.
pij = tijpi: (A-11)
Step 4: Aggregating across varieties, we can get the trade ow from i to j.
TCij = ni
C
ijE
C
j
= ni

tijpi
Pj
1 
 jYj : (A-12)
Step 5: Market clearing condition holds.
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Y Ci =
X
j
TCij
= nip
1 
i
X
j

tij
Pj
1 
 jYj ; (A-13)
Rewriting it gives:
nip
1 
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:
Step 6: A gravity equation for intermediate trade ow can now be derived:
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Chapter 5
Conclusions and Future
Research
With the rise of global production sharing, we have seen a gap between the empirical
regularity and scholarly work in the literature. This thesis explores the implications
of trade in intermediate goods for the aggregated degree of exchange rate pass-
through, rmsinvoicing currency choice and the gravity predictions in each of the
three chapters. Incorporating trade in intermediate goods into several strands of
literature in international economics allows for a richer discussion on real world re-
lated issues such as comparing the degrees of exposure to external shocks between
counties and industries during a recession. One common conjecture is that trade in
intermediate goods has declined more rapidly than global trade, i.e. the bullwhip ef-
fect. Ferrantino and Taglioni (2014) show that trade in intermediate goods dropped
drastically when the Global Trade Collapse started and boomed back quickly in the
end of 2009. They also show a substantial regional and sectoral variation depending
on the nature of the linkage.
I also nd similar patterns from UK import data between the year of 2002 and
2011. Overall, during the period imports of intermediate goods grew faster than
either imports of capital or consumption goods. The 2008-09 global crisis had a
signicant impact on imports of intermediate goods whereas imports of consumption
goods were less responsive to the recession. When looking into sectoral di¤erences
(at the SITC 1-digit level), in six out of nine industries imports of intermediate
goods grew faster and were more volatile than imports of consumption goods. The
exceptions are food and live animals (SITC 0), beverages and tobacco (SITC 1) and
miscellaneous manufactured articles (SITC 8). These ndings all suggest a di¤erent
nature of trade in intermediate goods as opposed to trade in nal goods.
In this thesis I rst introduce a back-and-forth trade structure into a two-country
model to study the e¤ects on the aggregated degree of exchange rate pass-through.
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The key channel is through rmsendogenous currency choice. Chapter 2 shows
that back-and-forth trade is associated with lower aggregated degrees of exchange
rate pass-through. This framework o¤ers a theoretical ground for testing the re-
lationship between back-and-forth trade and the degree of pass-through. This is
particularly relevant for examining the heterogeneity in pass-through across indus-
tries. In the UK, for example, the degree of pass-through to import prices exhibits
signicant heterogeneity across industries (Mumtaz, Oomen, and Wang, 2006). In
future work, I plan to study whether this variation can be attributed to di¤erent
currency behaviours or frequencies of price adjustments across industries.
Another extension I plan to do next is to follow Gopinath, Itskhoki and Rigobon
(2010) to examine how rmsprice adjustments di¤er depending on the currencies
in which prices are set. They use US data and actually most of US exports as
well as imports are priced in US dollars. Empirical evidence from the UK, a small
open economy, will therefore add insights to the link between invoicing currency and
the frequencies of price adjustments. In my view, both currency choice and price
setting are crucial to fully understand the estimations of short-run and long-run
pass-through. It is therefore important to examine the interactions between these
two channels through which domestic prices and ination rates respond to exchange
rate shocks.
There are large di¤erences in invoicing currency choice across rms, even across
rms that export the same product to the same country at the same time. The
explanation has to come from rm characteristics. The stylised facts documented in
Chapter 3 are completely new and I view this as the main contribution of the thesis.
In the paper I consider rm sizes in terms of export shares and rm experience in
terms of the years of exporting. These proxies are obtained from the export dataset
and therefore they somehow relate to rmsexporting behaviour. In future work,
I plan to incorporate the FAME (Financial Analysis Made Easy) dataset which
contains information on U.K. company proles such as operating revenues, numbers
of employees and nancial strength indicators. In doing so it will shed light on the
role other rm characteristics play in determining currency choice. For instance, it
is possible to identify intra-rm trade for multinationals and examine its impact on
currency denomination.
Chapter 3 also speaks to the hedging literature. In the paper, I introduce ex-
portersdependence on imported inputs as an alternative determinant of their in-
voicing currency choice. Firms more dependent on imported are more likely to
choose the same currency used for their imported inputs to price their exports.
Although the intuition of the theoretical mechanism is rather subtle, this theoret-
ical prediction is consistent with the idea of a natural hedging and supported by
the data. Do rms actually pursue a natural hedging or simply rely on nancial
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instruments? How do the practices di¤er geographically? My paper opens up the
possibility to disentangle rmsnancial operations from natural hedging under the
considerations of exchange rate uncertainty.
Another aspect Chapter 3 does not consider is the trend of currency choice over
time. Although I do not observe much variation in the general patterns of invoicing
currency when comparing the 2010 and 2011 UK data, it is desirable to examine
a longer time span to further understand the determinants of invoicing currency
choice. One possible explanation for a stable invoicing currency pattern is that
trading partners may sign a short-term to medium-term contract with each other
specifying an invoicing currency in which prices will be quoted.
In Chapter 2 and 3 an implicit assumption based on monopolistic competition is
that exporters do choose their own invoicing currencies. There has been empirical
evidence from Swedish survey data that a large proportion of exporters do set their
own currency (Friberg and Wilander, 2008). However in reality this may be industry
or location specic and in some cases exporters settle a currency through bargaining
with the importers. Questionnaire studies would thus be desirable to explore the
nature of currency setting in more depth.
Chapter 4 suggests a link between gravity equations and the labour shares of
income. The model yields some testable hypotheses to take labour shares of income
into account. The results, however, may be specic to models with monopolistic
competition and CES demand structures. One potential direction for future work
is to study whether similar results can also be obtained from other trade models.
Another related topic of interest is the estimation of trade elasticities. There
has been studies showing an increase in trade elasticities with respect to global
income due to the rise of global intermediate input linkages (Escaith, Lindenberg and
Miroudot, 2010). Is there a variation across industries? Can accounting for labour
shares of income help improve the estimation of cross-sectoral trade elasticities?
These are questions to be answered.
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